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ARTICLES

Terror on the High Seas
THE TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS
OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY MEASURES
Marjorie Florestal†
I.

INTRODUCTION
It really boggles my mind that there could be 40,000 nuclear
weapons, or maybe 80,000, in the former Soviet Union, poorly
controlled and poorly stored, and that the world isn’t in a near state
of hysteria about the danger.
—Howard Baker, U.S. Ambassador to Japan1

†
Marjorie Florestal is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of the
Pacific, McGeorge School of Law (B.A., J.D. New York University). The author
expresses deep appreciation to the colleagues and friends who sat through numerous
discussions on what they once considered an obscure topic. In particular, heartfelt
appreciation to Raj Bhala, Andrea Bjorklund, and Peggy McGuinness for insightful
comments on an earlier draft of this work; Ruth Jones, Thom Main, Greg Pingree, Kojo
Yelpaala, and participants in the McGeorge faculty works in progress helped the
author shape these ideas, and the able intervention of some wonderful research
assistants was critically important to the success of this work—particular thanks to
Antonia Badway who shepherded this project through its very early stages. Lee
Sheldon subsequently took up the mantle with assistance from Nicole Sargent and
Lindsey Read. This article was supported by a McGeorge Summer Research Fund.
1
Testimony of Howard Baker before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, quoted in Graham Allison, Fighting Terrorism – By Invitation – Could
Worse Be Yet to Come?, ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 2001, available at http://www.economist.
com/world/na/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=842483. In fact the world—and certainly the
United States—is very concerned with the possible implications. U.N. Resolution 1540
“[a]ffirm[s] that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as
their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security” and
goes on to prohibit states in aiding or abetting non-state actors from acquiring such
weapons. S.C. Res. 1540 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (April 28, 2004) [hereinafter
Resolution 1540]. The resolution also directs states to establish effective domestic
controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass
destruction. Id. In addition, in 2003, President Bush announced the establishment of
the Proliferation Security Initiative (“PSI”), which would seek international
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Shipping containers are the new frontline in the War on
Terror. Before September 11, 2001, the innocuous forty by
eighty foot steel structures were seen as nothing more than
floating boxes meant to transport goods from country of
production to country of consumption.2 If Americans gave any
thought to the millions of containers that find their way to U.S.
shores each year, at best, they imagined that within their
narrow, windowless confines were several tons of used clothes
bound for the Dominican Republic, or perhaps toys imported
from China. Few would have considered, even for a moment,
the possibility that a shipping container could house an AlQaeda terrorist. But only one month after the September 11
attacks, Italian officials intercepted Rizik Amid Farid, an
Egyptian national and reputed Al-Qaeda member, in a
container bound for Canada.3 Farid carried with him a
Canadian passport, along with several airport security passes,
and an aircraft mechanic certificate that allowed him entry
into sensitive areas in New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport, as
well as Newark International, Los Angeles International and
Chicago-O’Hare.4

agreements allowing the United States and its allies to interdict planes and ships
suspected of transporting nuclear cargo or weapons of mass destruction. ARMS
CONTROL ASS’N, THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) AT A GLANCE (Sept.
2005), http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/PSI.asp.
For a description of the
initiative and its impact in Asia, see Mark J. Valencia, The Proliferation Security
Initiative: Making Waves in Asia (Int’l Inst. for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No.
376, 2005).
2
Containers come in lengths of ten, twenty, thirty, and forty feet long by
eight feet wide, but the most common containers are the twenty- and forty-foot
varieties.
Construction-Guide.com, Matthew Bendert, Cargo Containers,
http://www.construction-guide.com/ cargo-containers.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2006).
3
PHILLIPE CRIST, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY IN MARITIME TRANSPORT: RISK FACTORS AND ECONOMIC
IMPACT 8-9 (2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/13/4375896.pdf
[hereinafter OECD REPORT]. See also Andrea Felsted & Mark Odell, Al-Qaeda: After
Afghanistan; Agencies Fear Extent of Al-Qaeda’s Sea Network, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 21,
2002, available at http://specials.ft.com/attackonterrorism/FT3U47PPYXC.html.
Lawyers for Rizik Amid Farid deny that he was ever part of any terrorist organization,
claiming that he stowed away in a shipping container because “he had personal
problems in Egypt that made him flee that country.” Egyptian Stowaway Had
Canadian Passport, CBC NEWS, Oct. 26, 2001, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/
2001/10/25/stowaway_farid011025.html. When released from an Italian prison, Farid
disappeared. OECD REPORT, supra, at 8. See also Robert C. Bonner, U.S. Customs
Comm’r, Speech Before the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 17, 2002), available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/
commissioner/speeches_statements/archives/2002/jan172002.xml [hereinafter Bonner
Jan. 2002].
4
OECD REPORT, supra note 3, at 7. See also Felsted & Odell, supra note 3.
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How could the enemy so easily infiltrate the most
important link in the global trade supply chain?5 Experts
believe without the intermodal shipping container—standardsized steel boxes that can be hoisted onto a ship as a single unit
and transported by sea, rail, and truck—globalization would
not have been possible.6 Before the invention of the shipping
container, goods were individually loaded onto a ship piece by
piece in “break bulk,” an expensive process that often took days
to complete and subjected goods to theft or breakage.7
“Containerization” did for maritime shipping what Henry
Ford’s assembly line did for the automobile manufacturing
industry, largely automating the loading and unloading
process, thus making the system faster, more efficient, and cost
effective.8 But the very attributes of “the box”—its speed,
efficiency, and above all its anonymity—are what allowed Farid
5
The “enemy” has long infiltrated the maritime transportation industry.
Since Captain Blackbeard roamed the Caribbean Sea striking fear in the hearts of
sailors and merchants alike, maritime trade has had a long and colorful history of
criminal activity. For a discussion of Blackbeard’s exploits, see generally JEAN DAY,
BLACKBEARD, TERROR OF THE SEAS (1997). While current threats to the international
trade supply chain go far beyond piracy, the profession is not dead. See generally INT’L
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INT’L MAR. BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST
SHIPS, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT (2006). Most recently, passengers on a cruise ship bound
for Mombassa, Kenya found themselves in the midst of an all-out pirate attack. Cruise
Ship Repels Somali Pirates, BBC NEWS, INT’L VERSION, Nov. 5, 2005, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/4409662.stm. In 2003, The International Maritime Bureau Piracy
Reporting Centre, a non-governmental organization under the auspices of the
International Chamber of Commerce, reported that 445 ships were attacked by pirates.
See PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS, supra, at 5. The Malacca Strait and
the area around Sumatra and Indonesia pose the greatest risks of piratical attacks.
See Paul Dillon, Did Tsunamis Ruin Pirates of Sumatra?, GLOBE AND MAIL, Jan. 25,
2005, at A1. Of the 100,000 ships that sail through those waters carrying half of the
world’s oil supplies and one-third of all its cargo, 149 were subjected to pirate attacks
in 2003. See PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS, supra, at 5. Perhaps the
only bright spot from the devastating 2004 Tsunami in Asia was the short-lived respite
in pirate attacks in the region. See Dillon, supra, at A1.
6
For a history of containers and their impact on world trade, see generally
MARC LEVINSON, THE BOX: HOW THE SHIPPING CONTAINER MADE THE WORLD
SMALLER AND THE WORLD ECONOMY BIGGER (2006); see also Ron Adner, High
Technology and Strategy Project: Containers – Revolutionizing Global Transport, June
9, 2002, at 16, available at http://faculty.insead.fr/adner/PREVIOUS/Projects%20May/
Container%20Project.pdf.
7
Justin S.C. Mellor, Missing the Boat: The Legal and Practical Problems of
the Prevention of Maritime Terrorism, 18 AM. U. INT.’L L. REV. 341, 347 (2002) (citing
MARK L. CHADWIN ET AL., OCEAN CONTAINER TRANSPORTATION 1 (1990)).
8
Malcolm McLean is credited with inventing the containerization process in
1956. See Mellor, supra note 7, at 347-48. See also All Things Considered: Shipping
Containers in Seattle (NPR radio broadcast May 15, 2001), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1122981. Despite the impact of
his invention, McLean died in relative obscurity. See Barry Rascovar, Shipping
Pioneer Largely Ignored, BALT. SUN, June 14, 2001, at 23A.
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to bypass security safeguards. Those same characteristics have
made shipping containers the new frontline in the War on
Terror.
Over 90% of world trade moves by container.9 But only
about 2% of the nearly nine million containers entering the
United States each year are ever inspected.10 For the most
part, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”)—the
agency charged with protecting the nation’s land and sea
borders—has no firsthand knowledge of what is being
It must rely on the
transported in those containers.11
unverified information shippers provide in their cargo manifest
documents.12 This largely self-regulated system has seen a
number of security breaches: In 1999, the Interagency
Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports reported
that containers have been used to smuggle into the United
States everything from drugs to illegal arms and munitions to
More recently, scientist Abdul
undocumented workers.13
Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb, confessed
to smuggling nuclear equipment and technology to Libya, Iran
and North Korea in a smuggling network that spanned fifteen
9
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Fact Sheet (Mar. 29, 2006) at 2, available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/
cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/csi_fact_sheet.ctt/csi_fact_sheet.doc
[hereinafter CSI Fact Sheet]. See also Bonner Jan. 2002, supra note 3.
10
Bonner Jan. 2002, supra note 3. See also, OECD REPORT supra note 3, at
7. The amount of container traffic to the United States is expected to more than double
over the next two decades. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-295, § 101, 116 Stat. 2064, 2066 (2002).
11
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency is far more comprehensive
than the former U.S. Customs Service. As a result of the World Trade Center attacks,
on March 1, 2003, all immigration inspectors, agricultural inspectors, and the border
patrol merged to form one agency, under the Department of Homeland Security, with
exclusive authority to patrol and manage U.S. borders. See Robert C. Bonner, U.S.
Customs Comm’r, Remarks of Commissioner Robert C. Bonner: 2003 Liner CEO
Forum (Apr. 1, 2003), available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/
speeches_statements/archives/2003/apr01003.xml [hereinafter Bonner 2003].
12
See Bonner Jan. 2002, supra note 3.
13
The Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports
concluded that drug smuggling was the most prevalent reported crime, with the twelve
seaports participating in the study reporting that between 1996-1998, narcotics seized
constituted 69% of total weight of cocaine, 55% of marijuana, and 12% of heroin. The
smuggling of illegal aliens was the second-most prevalent problem, with the twelve
participating seaports reporting 1187 stowaways and 247 individuals with fraudulent
documents arriving aboard vessels between 1996 and 1999 alone. Finally, cargo
theft—often conducted by organized crime figures—was identified as the third-most
prevalent problem, accounting for between $6 billion and $12 billion of direct losses
annually. S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Port and Maritime
Security Act of 2001, S. 1214, 107th Cong. (2002); S. REP. NO. 107-64, at 5 (2001)
[hereinafter Port and Maritime Security Act].
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years.14 Khan purportedly shipped all of his nuclear materials
inside containers.15
The seemingly obvious solution to the security risk
posed by shipping containers is to increase the number of
inspections. Why not inspect 100% of the containers arriving in
the United States? If Customs was to adopt such a policy, the
supply chain16 would grind to a halt, trailing global economic
catastrophe in its wake.17 In a “just-in-time” world—where
businesses purchase and accept delivery of products as needed
rather than buying them in advance and incurring expensive
warehousing and other storage costs—the slightest delay in the
delivery of goods leads to significant economic loss.18 In 2002, a
14
In a televised confession, Khan admitted selling nuclear material and
begged for clemency. Profile: Abdul Qadeer Khan, BBC NEWS, INT’L EDITION, Feb. 20,
2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3343621.stm. See also Global
Security, Weapons of Mass Destruction: A.Q. Khan, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/
world/pakistan/khan.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
15
Christian Caryl, The Box Is King, NEWSWEEK INT’L, Apr. 10 2006 (citing
former U.S. State Department official David Asher), available at http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/12112804/site/newsweek. Examples such as Farid and Khan are only the
tip of the iceberg. In recent years, terrorist organizations have begun to use the
maritime industry in novel and sophisticated ways to advance their objectives. A
number of terrorist groups are reported to own maritime fleets that conduct both
legitimate and shadowy activities to generate profits. The Liberation Tigers of Tamile
Eelam (LTTE), a guerilla force at war with the Sri Lankan government since the
1980s, is perhaps the most engaged in the shipping industry, with a profitable fleet
estimated at ten to twelve freighters. See OECD REPORT, supra note 3, at 14. Al
Qaeda also owns or controls a fleet of fifteen cargo vessels. See John Mintz, 15
Freighters Believed to Be Linked to Al Qaeda, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2002, at A1.
16
A “supply chain” generally is defined as a network of retailers, distributors,
transporters, storage facilities, and suppliers that participate in the sale, delivery, and
production of a particular product. See Supply-Chain Council, Supply-Chain.Org: FAQ,
http://www.supply-chain.org/cs/root/about_us/faq (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
17
In addition to the costs imposed by 100% inspection, some experts argue
that it would amount to no more than a waste of time and effort. See Alane Kochems &
James Jay Carafano, One Hundred Percent Cargo Scanning and Cargo Seals: Wasteful
and Unproductive Proposals, The Heritage Foundation (May 5, 2006), http://www.
heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/wm1064.cfm (noting that “[i]nspecting every
container that is shipped to the U.S. makes no sense. Doing so would cost billions of
dollars and drown authorities in useless information. Moreover, it is not clear why
every container would require inspection. The ‘nuke-in-a-box’ scenarios deployed to
justify such drastic measures are highly implausible.”). Despite that, CBP appears to
be moving towards a 100% inspection model. As a result of the Security and
Accountability for Every Port Act, signed into law October 13, 2006, CBP has directed
additional resources to the nation’s busiest port—Los Angeles-Long Beach—to ensure
that by January 2007, 100% of container traffic exiting the port by truck and rail will
be screened for nuclear and radiological materials. Press Release, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, SAFE Ports LA/Long Beach Style: CBP Shows Off High-Tech
Equipment to Detect Radiological Weapons (Nov. 2, 2006), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/
newsroom/news_releases/112006/11022006.xml (statement of Commissioner W. Ralph
Basham).
18
The U.S automobile industry is a case in point. After the borders reopened
within just days of the September 11 attacks, the backlog of container traffic was so
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ten-day strike by West Coast area dock workers was estimated
to cost the U.S. economy as much as $1 billion a day,19
ultimately leading the President to invoke federal authority to
order strikers back to work.20 And a mere two-day delay in
shipments after the September 11 attacks nearly crippled the
U.S. automobile industry.21 Moreover, merely increasing the
number of inspections would not lead to greater security.
Without sufficient information to target specific containers,
Customs would be searching for the proverbial needle-in-thehaystack—at great economic cost.
But if September 11 revealed the tragic gaps in airport
security, when those two airplanes hit the World Trade Center
it also forced Customs officials to acknowledge holes in the
maritime trade security infrastructure. If a shipping container
could house an Al Qaeda operative, could it also hold a “dirty
bomb”?22 Could a terrorist stow a nuclear device in a container,
ship it to one of the nation’s busiest ports, and then detonate
that device by remote control upon arrival? The “nuke-in-abox” scenario, which would have seemed far-fetched before
September 11, now drives U.S. container security policy. Just
four months after the attacks, Customs adopted the
controversial Container Security Initiative (“CSI”), describing
it in this way:
severe that it caused enormous delays in auto-parts shipments from Canada and
Mexico, which in turn jeopardized the industry’s financial position and threatened to
lead to plant closings and massive layoffs. See Bonner Jan. 2002, supra note 3. As the
war on terrorism heats up, U.S. companies are purchasing products further in advance
of what is needed (just-in-case inventory). One expert estimates the increased
inventory holding could add $50 to $80 billion in U.S. costs and wipe away
approximately half of the productivity gains the U.S. has achieved in the past ten
years. OECD REPORT, supra note 3, at 18 (citing Donald Bowserbox & David Closs,
Supply Chain Sustainability and Cost in the New War Economy, TRAFFIC WORLD, Apr.
1, 2002).
19
Press Release, White House, President Takes Action to Protect America’s
Economy and Jobs (Oct. 7, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/10/20021007-3.html. See also U.S. Won’t Cite Either Side in Dock
Dispute, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at A31. Underscoring the difficulty of quantifying
economic losses in the maritime industry, the figures on losses generated by the West
Coast strike vary widely. Some experts discount the $1 billion a day figure and peg
losses at less than $500 million per day for the total ten-day lock-out period. See
Patrick L. Anderson, Lost Earning Due to the West Coast Port Shutdown: Preliminary
Estimate 1 (Anderson Econ. Group LLC, Working Paper No. 2002-10, 2002).
20
David E. Sanger, President Invokes Taft-Hartley Act to Open 29 Ports, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2002, at A1.
21
Bonner Jan. 2002, supra note 3. Ironically, after the September 11
attacks, only a few critical ports were closed in the New York area and the general
container trade was not significantly impacted. OECD REPORT, supra note 3, at 4.
22
A “dirty bomb” is one “made of nuclear materials wrapped around
conventional explosives.” Felsted & Odell, supra note 3.
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Imagine if a weapon of mass destruction sitting in a container within
the sea cargo environment were detonated. This program helps keep
that from happening.23

Designed to “extend the zone of security outward,” CSI’s
central premise is that American seaports and borders must
become the last line of defense and not the first.24 In short, by
the time a nuclear device hidden in a shipping container laden
with Chinese footwear finds its way into a U.S. port, it is
already too late. CSI is meant to prevent just such an
occurrence.25 Rather than waiting until the container arrives
in the United States, CSI shifts security and screening
activities to the border of the exporting country. With the host

23
Slide Presentation, CSI, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Response to
Terrorism,
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/international_
activities/csi/csirev_1002.ctt/standard_current_generic_csi.ppt
[hereinafter
Slide
Presentation].
24
Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Remarks of Tom Ridge at the Port
of Newark, New Jersey (June 12, 2003), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/
display?content=960 [hereinafter Ridge].
25
CSI was not the only security measure to be adopted post-September 11.
To protect America’s ports, ships and cargo, the United States adopted a “layered”
security system featuring a separate but related latticework of over twenty-five laws,
regulations and initiatives, including both voluntary and mandatory measures, and
affecting both domestic and international participants. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
SECURE SEAS, OPEN PORTS: KEEPING OUR WATERS SAFE, SECURE AND OPEN FOR
BUSINESS 3-4 (June 21, 2004), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
DHSPortSecurityFactSheet-062104.pdf:

Figure 1: Layers of Port and Maritime Security – Post-September 11
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government’s permission,26 Customs agents are posted in the
foreign port where they inspect “high risk” containers bound for
the United States before they ever leave the foreign port.27
In principle, CSI began as no more than a voluntary
program by which Customs, through a series of bilateral
agreements, obtains authorization from some of the United
States’ top trading partners to deploy personnel abroad in
order to prevent a catastrophe at home.28 But in practice, CSI
is a “hidden revolution”29 that has radically altered the way
international maritime trade is conducted, and it has
transformed the world trade system. The effect of CSI has
been to favor some trading partners over others, creating clear
winners and losers. Opting to implement the program in three
26
Bonner Jan. 2002, supra note 3. CSI teams are not legally authorized,
however, to inspect containers on their own but must seek permission from the host
government to inspect any shipments. If permission is not granted, the shipment is
sent to the United States without inspection, although CSI teams are required to place
a domestic hold on the shipment, so that it will be inspected upon arrival at its U.S.
destination. A recent report by the Government Accountability Office has found that,
in at least a few instances, some containers which CSI teams had labeled “high-risk”
but which host government officials had not permitted to be inspected in-country were
also not inspected upon arrival in the United States. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-05-466T, HOMELAND SECURITY: KEY CARGO SECURITY PROGRAMS CAN BE
IMPROVED 4 (May 26, 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05466t.pdf
[hereinafter GAO REPORT, May 2005] (statement of Richard M. Stana, Director,
Homeland Security and Justice Issues).
27
In a reciprocal program, CSI authorizes participating countries to post
their own officials at U.S. borders. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-770,
CONTAINER SECURITY: EXPANSION OF KEY CUSTOMS PROGRAMS WILL REQUIRE
GREATER ATTENTION TO CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 10 n.10 (July 2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03770.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT 2003]. Canada
and Japan have posted officials to the United States. Id. While CSI’s critical
innovation is that it moves inspection of high-risk containers to a much earlier point in
the overall process, the program incorporates three additional components:
(1) Establish security criteria to identify those containers that are considered “highrisk”; (2) Use non-intrusive equipment such as radiation, gamma, and x-rays to quickly
pre-screen high-risk containers; and (3) Develop secure and “smart” devices that could
detect any tampering with the container that might have occurred en route. Bonner
Jan. 2002, supra note 3.
28
While CSI began as an initiative of Customs—taken under its own
authority—on October 13, 2006, President Bush signed into law The Port Security
Improvement Act of 2006, which codified the program. The move toward codification
appeared to be an effort on the part of Congress to actively manage the port security
issue. Jeff Berman, Bush Signs Off on New Port-Security Legislation, LOGISTICS
MGMT., Oct.
1,
2006,
available
at
http://www.logisticsmgmt.com/article/
CA6382237.html?stt=000&pubdate=10%2F01%2F2006
(“As
certain
programs
like . . . CSI go toward increasing cooperation between the government and shippers,
we make them a product of statutory authority, as opposed to just a program of the
administrations. . . . We put the imprimatur of the Congress on it . . . .” (quoting Rep.
Dan Lungren)).
29
Caryl, supra note 15 (quoting Former Coast Guard Captain, Stephen
Flynn).
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stages,30 Customs initially excluded from CSI membership all
but the top twenty “megaports”—those ports that send the
largest volume of container traffic to the United States.31 In
Phase II of the project, ports of political or strategic
significance are permitted membership in CSI provided they
meet certain criteria.32 Only in Phase III will ports that require
30

Bonner 2003, supra note 11.
The top twenty megaports account for over 70% of the maritime container
traffic to the United States. Robert C. Bonner, U.S. Customs Comm’r, Remarks of U.S.
Customs Comm’r Robert C. Bonner: Center for Strategic and International Studies
(Aug. 26, 2002), available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/
speeches_statements/archives/2002/aug262002.xml [hereinafter Bonner Aug. 2002].
By June 2003, nineteen of the top twenty ports had agreed to implement CSI, and CBP
Commissioner Bonner along with Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge were able
to announce Phase II of CSI. Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
Secretary Ridge Announces Security Initiatives Phase II (June 12, 2003), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/cbp_press_releases/0620
03/06122003_2.xml.
Currently, there are fifty-one operational CSI ports throughout the world:
31

Africa (1):
South Africa (1).
Asia (17):
Singapore (1), Japan (4), Hong Kong (1), South Korea (1), Malaysia
(2), Thailand (1), UAE (1), China (4), Sri Lanka (1), Oman (1).
Europe (24):
The Netherlands (1), Germany (2), Belgium (2), France (2), Sweden
(2), Italy (5), United Kingdom (5), Greece (1). Spain (3), Portugal
(1).
The Americas (9):
Canada (3), Brazil (1), Argentina (1), Honduras (1), The Dominican
Republic (1), Jamaica (1), The Bahamas (1).
Ports in CSI – CBP.gov, Currently Operational Ports (Sept. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/ports_in_csi.xml
[hereinafter Ports in CSI].
32
To participate in CSI a candidate nation must commit to the following
minimum standards:
The Customs Administration must be able to inspect cargo originating,
transiting, exiting, or being transshipped through a country.
Non-intrusive inspectional (NII) equipment (including gamma or X-ray
imaging capabilities) and traditional detection equipment must be available
and utilized for conducting such inspections. The equipment is necessary in
order to meet the objective of quickly screening containers without disrupting
the flow of legitimate trade.
The seaport must have regular, direct, and substantial container traffic to
ports in the United States.
Commit to establishing a risk management system to identify potentially
high-risk containers, and automating that system. This system should
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technical assistance and capacity building—those ports in
developing countries—be considered for CSI membership.33
Membership in CSI comes with tangible benefits, the
most significant of which is the ability to move through
Customs with little delay. Given these benefits, exporters are
more likely to source from countries with CSI-certified ports.
In fact, that appears to be a deliberate design of the program;
Customs admits that “[i]n the event of a terrorist attack, the
CSI ports would have a competitive advantage. They would be
rewarded for their foresight.”34
CSI’s “hidden revolution” has impacted the world, but
the effect of the measure is perhaps more deeply felt at the
margins. Given CSI’s staggered implementation schedule,
along with the conditionalities imposed on membership, most
developing countries become eligible to participate years after
the program has been implemented in developed countries’
ports. Moreover, even if they are eligible, many of the poorer
developing countries do not have the resources and technical
know-how to implement CSI’s requirements (indeed, at least
one developed country is finding implementation beyond its
capacity).35 The developing country perspective is virtually

include a mechanism for validating threat assessments and targeting
decisions and identifying best practices.
Commit to sharing critical data, intelligence, and risk management
information with the United States Customs service in order to do
collaborative targeting, and developing an automated mechanism for these
exchanges.
Conduct a thorough port assessment to ascertain vulnerable links in a port’s
infrastructure and commit to resolving those vulnerabilities.
Commit to maintaining integrity programs to prevent lapses in employee
integrity and to identify and combat breaches in integrity.
CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 9, at 3.
33
While Phase III has not been officially announced, CBP has begun to
incorporate some developing countries into the CSI program. As of September 2006,
CSI was operational in ports in Kingston, Jamaica, Freeport, The Bahamas and
Caucedo, the Dominican Republic. Ports in CSI, supra note 31. CSI also added ports
in Buenos Aires, Argentina and Puerto Cortes, Honduras. Id.
34
CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 9, at 4.
35
Greece, a CSI participant, member of the European Union, and host of the
2004 Summer Olympics, did not have the requisite technology. In a departure from
standard procedure, the United States supplied the necessary technology on loan. See
GlobalSecurity.org, Greece Signs Container Security Agreement with U.S., June 25,
2004, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2004/06/sec040625-usia01.htm [hereinafter Greece Signs Agreement].
CSI requires that
participating members have the requisite non-intrusive inspectional equipment (NII),
including gamma and x-rays, in place. See also CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 9, at 3
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ignored in the balance the United States has struck between
protecting its borders and ensuring the efficacy of the maritime
trade supply chain. For developing countries, exclusion from
CSI creates a formidable non-tariff barrier to trade, further
entrenchment of existing trading patterns that favor the rich,
and greater marginalization of preference programs like the
African Growth and Opportunity Act, all of which are likely to
have severe consequences for their development agendas.
Beyond the impact on developing countries, CSI also
poses a significant dilemma for the trading system. Terrorism
is the single greatest threat facing the multilateral system in
the twenty-first century, yet CSI’s unilateral approach
bypasses the multilateral system altogether. By opting for a
“go it alone” strategy—working with just a few like-minded
states—rather than seeking to build a broad-based coalition of
countries to address the problem, the United States is
effectively undermining multilateralism.36 If the multilateral
system is ineffective in dealing with the greatest challenge
today, then its ultimate demise is inevitable. Given that the
multilateral trading system has effectively advanced U.S.
interests in a number of areas, undermining the system by
choosing a unilateral approach ultimately jeopardizes U.S.
interests.
In the face of terrorist threats, the idea that the United
States would take measures to protect its ports and the
maritime trade supply chain is not surprising, particularly
given the importance of the system and the enormity of the
crisis a successful attack would precipitate. The critical
question, therefore, is not should the United States take action,
but rather how should the United States implement such
action so as to maximize protection of domestic security
interests while minimizing potential economic harm to both the
United States and its trading partners.
This article analyzes CSI and argues that the program’s
discriminatory and unilateral approach will ultimately prove
detrimental to developing countries, U.S. security interests,
and the multilateral trading system as a whole. Part II
evaluates CSI within the context of U.S. international
obligations, arguing that CSI violates the non-discrimination
(“Does CBP provide X-ray or gamma ray detection technology to help scan containers?
CSI implementation requires the host country to have NII equipment.”).
36
For a more detailed discussion of the unilateral/bilateral approach, see
infra, section III.A.
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requirement of GATT Article I, and it is not justified by the
national security exception of GATT Article XXI because it fails
to consider the impact on development. Part III concludes with
a prescription for a more development-friendly measure that
balances the need for domestic security with the development
objectives of the trading system’s most vulnerable members.
II.

A UNILATERAL APPROACH TO A MULTILATERAL
PROBLEM: CSI AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

It is by now cliché to assert that September 11, 2001 has
changed the face of U.S. society. Confronted with the single
greatest terrorist37 catastrophe ever to hit American soil, the
United States responded in ways that have had enduring
effects both at home and abroad. Domestically, legislation like
the USA Patriot Act38 reversed long-cherished notions of the
law’s role in regulating government’s interaction with the
accused. A body of law that once championed the rights of
criminal defendants has now given way to notions of “enemy
combatants” and indefinite detentions without charge or access
to legal counsel.39 And internationally, the United States’
37

Defining terrorism is a complex endeavor, and it has often been said that
“one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” Boaz Ganor, Defining
Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?, Institute for
Counter-Terrorism (ICT), available at http://www.ictconference.org/var/119/17070Def%20Terrorism%20by%20Dr.%20Boaz%20Ganor.pdf. U.S. law defines terrorism as
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.” 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2004 &
Supp. 2006). But by that measure, the U.S. also labeled as “terrorism” efforts of the
African National Congress (ANC) to liberate South Africa from the tyranny of a racist
minority regime. From the Irish Republican Army to the Palestine Liberation
Organization to the ANC, governments have long sought to delegitimize armed dissent,
even in the face of popular support for the combatants or the “justness” of the
liberation struggle. While coming to an accepted definition of terrorism is beyond the
scope of this article, few would dispute that the perpetrators of September 11—
targeting as they did unarmed, non-combatant civilians—engaged in acts of terrorism.
For further discussion of the dangers inherent in defining terrorism, see Ganor, supra
(noting that “[t]he statement, ‘One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,’
has become not only a cliché, but also one of the most difficult obstacles in coping with
terrorism. . . . In the struggle against terrorism, the problem of definition is a crucial
element in the attempt to coordinate international collaboration, based on the
currently accepted rules of traditional warfare.”).
38
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.), was passed one
month after the World Trade Center attacks with little debate and by an overwhelming
margin in both houses of Congress (Senate: 98-1; House: 357-66). See 147 CONG. REC.
S11060 (2001); 147 CONG. REC. H7224 (2001).
39
For a critique of U.S. domestic measures in the face of terrorism, see David
D. Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV.
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posture shifted from one focused on building strong
international institutions to combat common problems to one
championing pre-emptive war and shying away from
institution-building for fear that those same institutions would
be turned against American interests.40 In short, in the
aftermath of September 11, the U.S. worldview swung from
multilateral cooperation to a go-it-alone strategy or at best a
bilateral approach—a “coalition of the willing”—working with
only a handful of like-minded states.
No aspect of U.S. foreign policy escaped this new
approach. Even in the international trade arena, where
multilateralism has brought decisive benefits to the American
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003) (arguing that the United States has not learned the
lessons of the McCarthy Era, and any decline in the traditional forms of repression are
“more than offset” by the development of new ones).
40
The United States’ position regarding the creation of the International
Criminal Court (“ICC”) presents perhaps the starkest example of America’s move away
from multilateralism and institution-building. From President Woodrow Wilson’s
League of Nations to the post-World War II efforts of Roosevelt, Truman and
Eisenhower to create the United Nations and the multinational economic institutions
like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the United States had been
at the forefront of international institution-building. But with respect to the ICC, one
Bush Administration official noted baldly, “[It] is an organization whose precepts go
against fundamental American notions of sovereignty, checks and balances, and
national independence. It is an agreement that is harmful to the national interests of
the United States, and harmful to our presence abroad.” John R. Bolton, Under Sec’y
for Arms Control and Int’l Sec., The United States and the International Criminal
Court, Remarks to the Federalist Society (Nov. 14, 2002), available at http://www.state.
gov/t/us/rm/15158.htm. Rather than championing the fledgling institution, the United
States renounced its signature of the Rome Statute of the ICC and negotiated a
number of bilateral agreements—so-called Article 98 agreements—whereby signatory
states agreed not to submit U.S. citizens to the jurisdiction of the court. U.S.
Communication to the United Nations (May 6, 2002), available at http://untreaty.
un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty11.asp.
For a
discussion of these Article 98 agreements and their legal impact, see Chet J. Tan, Jr,
The Proliferation of Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements Among Non-Ratifiers of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1115 (2004).
Article 98 of the Rome Statute provides:
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance
which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its
obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic
immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first
obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would
require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under
international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is
required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court
can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent
for the surrender.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 98, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/9.htm.
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economy, the United States has acted unilaterally to combat
the scourge of terrorism.41 CSI is illustrative of that general
trend. The following section explores whether CSI conforms to
U.S. obligations under the World Trade Organization. It first
examines CSI in the context of Article I of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”). Maintaining that
CSI likely violates Article I, the section goes on to determine
whether the national security exception of GATT Article XXI
provides a viable excuse for the derogation.
A.

Does CSI Violate Article I’s Most Favored Nation
Obligation?

When the United States proposed creation of the
International Trade Organization, the still-born precursor to
the GATT, the very idea that the world trade community could
be ordered in a non-discriminatory fashion—that members
would be bound by the same obligations and entitled to the
same benefits—was the height of controversy.42 The history of
trading relations up until 1946 was one in which advantages
were bestowed or compelled through special relationships,
economic duress, and even war.43 The bold declaration of nondiscrimination inherent in GATT Article I was a call to
reinvent the status quo ante.44 In this new world order,
41
In recent days, it appears the Bush Administration is re-thinking its “go it
alone” strategy. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, A Bush Alarm: Shun Isolation, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 2006, at A1 (“The president who made pre-emption and going it alone the
watchwords of his first term is quietly turning in a new direction, warning at every
opportunity of the dangers of turning the nation inward and isolationist, and making
the case for international engagement on issues from national security to global
economics.”).
42
For a discussion of the negotiations on the ultimately unsuccessful
International Trade Organization, see generally CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD
TRADE (1949).
43
See generally KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 42 (1970) (stating that “[t]he United States had made
elimination of all preferences a major principle of its policy for post-war organization of
world trade”).
44
To be sure, Article I does not eliminate all discrimination recognizing as it
does the preferential relationships between some countries and their former colonies.
See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I, sec. II, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/
gatt47.pdf [hereinafter GATT] (allowing pre-existing preferences for inter alia, “two or
more territories which . . . were connected by common sovereignty or relations of
protection or suzerainty”). In addition, GATT-WTO law allows for a number of waivers
of the MFN obligation, including a waiver to provide for “differential and more
favourable treatment” to developing countries. Decision on Differential and More
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, ¶
1, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203-05 (1980). Other waivers
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preference-based trading relationships would give way to an
all-for-one-and-one-for-all system of trading. Almost singlehandedly,45 the United States persuaded those nations
represented in the GATT negotiations to adopt nondiscrimination—or “most favored nation” treatment—as the
cornerstone obligation of the new, rules-based system of
trading.46 While the United States was one of the earliest
champions of non-discriminatory trading relationships,47 the
of the MFN obligation can be found in GATT Article XXIV’s sanction of regional
trading agreements—free trade areas and customs unions—which necessarily
discriminate in favor of their members; and of course, the general exceptions of the
GATT embodied in Articles XX and XXI constitute waivers of the MFN obligation.
45
As early as 1941, before the end of World War II, Prime Minister Winston
Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt met secretly off the coast of Newfoundland
to chart the course of the new world order. “There they jointly agreed that the
principle of multilateralism would be the cornerstone of an emergent international
economic system.”
See Daniel Drache, The Short but Significant Life of the
International Trade Organization: Lessons for Our Time 8 (Ctr. for Canadian Studies,
Working Paper No. 62/00, 2000). British support for the ITO and the new order had
been purchased by the large amount of economic support the Americans had pledged
for post-war reconstruction. Id. Despite that, British support for the principle of MFN
was lukewarm at best, as they sought American agreement that discrimination “of a
defined and moderate degree in favour of a recognised political or geographical
grouping of states would be permitted,” primarily to preserve “a moderate degree of
Imperial Preference.” JOHN TOYE & RICHARD TOYE, THE U.N. AND GLOBAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY: TRADE, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 24 (2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
For the other participants not beholden to American financing, the
objections to MFN were particularly vociferous—and sometimes even amusing: The
Russian delegation contended that MFN was “a device of the devil to ensnare and
enslave small countries,” and the Latin American contingent eschewed MFN in favor of
a preference-based system that self-consciously took into consideration the interests of
developing countries:
[W]ealth and income . . . should be redistributed between the richer and the
poor states. Upon the rich, obligations should be imposed; upon the poor,
privileges should be conferred. The former should recognize it as their duty
to export capital for the development of backward areas; the latter should not
be expected . . . to insure the security of such capital, once it was obtained.
The former should reduce barriers to imports; the latter should be left free to
increase them. The former should sell manufactured goods below price
ceilings; the latter should sell raw materials and food stuffs above price
floors. Immediate requirements should be given precedence over long-run
policies, development over reconstruction, and the interests of regionalism
over world economy. Freedom of action, in the regulation of trade, must be
preserved. The voluntary acceptance by all states, of equal obligations with
respect to commercial policy must be rejected as an impairment of
sovereignty and a means by which the strong would dominate the weak.
WILCOX, supra note 42, at 32.
46
See DAM, supra note 43, at 42 (noting that “[t]he United States had made
elimination of all preferences a major principle of its policy for the post-war
organization of world trade.”).
47
Over time, U.S. support for MFN has been somewhat mercurial. It has
itself circumvented MFN’s precept, including its refusal in the 1950s to extend MFN
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Container Security Initiative bestows on some WTO members
certain advantages not afforded to others, thereby calling into
question its conformity with Article I.48
Article I:1 of the GATT provides in relevant part:
[W]ith respect to all rules and formalities in connection with
importation and exportation, . . . any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted by any Member to any product originating in or
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories of all other Members.49

The core obligation of Article I can be summed up in the idea
that “membership has its privileges”; by virtue of its
membership in the WTO, a country is entitled to receive the
same treatment—or at least treatment “no less favorable”—for
its imports as that received by other WTO members.50 The
prototypical example of the operation of most favored nation
(“MFN”) treatment involves tariffs. Imagine this scenario: The
United States, France and South Africa, all of whom are WTO
members, are engaged in a series of protracted (and
undoubtedly heated) negotiations over the tariff duty rate to be
treatment to communist countries. JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1997). But for a long time,
preference programs that would discriminate in favor of developing countries came
under considerable fire in U.S. trade circles.
Such programs were seen as
impermissible departures from the MFN principle. See id. See also ROBERT E. HUDEC,
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL
SYSTEM (1993) [hereinafter HUDEC, ENFORCING TRADE LAW].
48
While beyond the scope of this article, CSI may well violate other
provisions of the WTO Agreement, including the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade. South Africa, before it was admitted to CSI, appeared to make such an
argument. See Business Report, U.S. Customs, U.S. Plan Could Hurt Trade, July 22,
2002, available at http://www.tralac.org/scripts/content.php?id=407 [hereinafter
Business Report] (quoting a South African official stating “[t]he US initiative could be
discriminatory against the exports of developing countries and could be in breach of
World Trade Organisation rules. While acknowledging the US’s security concerns
behind this initiative, we are concerned that these should not be a license for unilateral
actions which unduly restrict trade.”). Moreover, even if U.S. action does not violate
the WTO agreement, non-CSI members may potentially raise a non-violation
nullification and impairment claim. But see Michael J. Hahn, Vital Interests and the
Law of GATT: An Analysis of GATT’s Security Exception, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 558, 61517 (1990) (arguing that a non-violation claim is inappropriate if the measure taken is
consistent with GATT Article XXI); see also GATT Panel Report, United States-Trade
Measures Affecting Nicaragua, ¶ 4.9, L/6053 (Oct. 13, 1986) [hereinafter U.S.-Trade
Measures Affecting Nicaragua] (declining to examine non-violation claim because there
were no remedies available under the circumstances if Nicaragua were to prevail).
49
GATT, supra note 44 (emphasis added).
50
Report of the Panel, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive
Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R (May 31, 2000) [hereinafter CanadaAutos].
AND

2007]

TERROR ON THE HIGH SEAS

401

imposed on imports of bottled water into the United States.
After much heated discussion, South Africa and the United
States manage to come to an agreement that would lower the
tariff from 10% to 5%. Negotiations between the French and
the Americans break down. MFN treatment nonetheless
requires the immediate and unconditional extension of the 5%
duty rate to French bottled water imports. Moreover, even
WTO members who chose not to participate in the negotiations
at all—for example, Italy—would be entitled to the same
benefits.51
The MFN obligation is not restricted to customs duties
or charges. It also includes the obligation to refrain from
discriminating among WTO members with respect to any
advantage, including domestic regulations, such as CSI.52 To
successfully establish a violation of MFN, three elements must
be satisfied: First, there must be an “advantage” of the type
covered by Article I; second, that advantage must not be
accorded to the “like product” of all WTO Members; and third,
that advantage must not be granted to members “immediately
and unconditionally.”53
An “advantage” in the WTO context is broadly defined.54
The advantages conferred by CSI membership are both
economic and political in scope. The greatest economic benefit
to participants is the ability to move through the shipping
process with little fear that containers will be stopped or
delayed at the U.S. border. Once containers from CSI ports
pass inspection in-country, they are usually not re-examined
51

For a general discussion of MFN, see RAJ BHALA, MODERN GATT LAW: A
TREATISE ON THE GENERAL AGREEMENT OF TARIFFS AND TRADE (2005). For a
discussion on the historical evolution of MFN, see Edward A. Laing, Equal
Access/Non-Discrimination and Legitimate Discrimination in International Economic
Law, 14 WIS. INT’L L.J. 246, 255-64 (1996).
52
GATT Article I:1 also provides:
[A]nd with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article
III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in
or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
GATT, supra note 44. GATT Article III:2 refers to taxes while GATT Article III:4 refers
to domestic regulations. Id.
53
Report of the Panel, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry, ¶ 14.138, WT/DS54/R (July 2, 1998).
54
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 206, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997)
(noting that a “broad definition has been given to the term ‘advantage’ in Article I:1 of
the GATT 1994”).
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upon entry to a U.S. port.55 In a “just-in-time” world, the
ability to navigate the trade supply chain with a minimum of
delay is a significant competitive advantage—even a single
day’s delay at Customs adds almost 1% to the cost of goods.56
CSI ports therefore immediately obtain “preferred” status, and
countries that do not have CSI-certified ports are at a
competitive disadvantage given the likelihood that their
shipments will undergo more complex examinations and will
thus be cleared more slowly.
Beyond the immediate fast-track benefit, CSI
membership also serves as an “insurance policy.” Should the
unimaginable happen and a terrorist attack is successfully
implemented against the maritime trade supply chain, CSI
ports would likely not be shut down at all, whereas shipments
from all other ports would not be allowed entry into the United
States.57 Even if the maritime transportation sector had to be
shut down completely, CSI-certified ports would begin handling
The
containerized cargo far sooner than other ports.58
implications for the economies of CSI and non-CSI-certified
countries are enormous.59 Ultimately, CSI-certification gives a
strategic business advantage to some ports over others; all
other things being equal, shippers who wish to continue
exporting to the United States are induced to ship from CSI
ports.
In addition to the economic benefits, CSI membership
also confers a significant political advantage to participants.
While a “voluntary” program, CSI is nevertheless a cornerstone
of the U.S. War on Terror. Few countries, even Germany and
France,60 are willing to be seen as obstructionist or non55

Ridge, supra note 24.
WORLD BANK REPORT, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2004: REALIZING THE
DEVELOPMENT PROMISE OF THE DOHA AGENDA 198 (2004), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRGEP2004/Resources/gep2004fulltext.pdf
[hereinafter Global Economic Prospects].
57
Bonner Aug. 2002, supra note 31.
58
CSI Fact Sheet 6, supra note 9, at 2-3.
59
After the French tanker Limburg was attacked in Yemen, underwriters
immediately tripled premiums for vessels calling on Yemeni ports (as much as
$300,000 per vessel). Some lines cut Yemen altogether from their schedules and
switched to neighboring ports, resulting in massive layoffs at Yemeni terminals (as
many as 3000 people) and losses totaling $15 million per month. Despite the
government’s efforts to retain business by putting in place a loss guarantee program,
shippers fled Yemen. OECD REPORT, supra note 3, at 17.
60
Both German and French ports signed bilateral CSI agreements with the
United States. Initially, their cooperation appeared costly when the European Union
Commission decided to bring infringement action against all EU member states that
56
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cooperative.61 Along with the big stick, however, comes a
tantalizing carrot: CSI members are seen as “partners” in the
War on Terror, and as such are entitled to special treatment.
For example, the United States loaned Greece the equipment
necessary to implement CSI despite the fact that CSI requires
a potential member to own the requisite equipment before it
can be considered for membership.62 And certainly Pakistan is
a poster child for the tangible benefits that accrue to
cooperative partners in the War on Terror.63
Membership in CSI thus brings substantial benefits.
For those left out of the system, the costs of being on the
frontlines of the War on Terror without a shield are
considerable.64 While CSI membership is no protection against
economic losses stemming from an actual terrorist attack,65 its
benefit on the front-end of the transaction—as a perceived
“insurance policy”—is enormous. Exporters are more likely to
utilize CSI-certified ports based on their assumption that those
had signed CSI agreements, alleging they had no such authority. The Commission
subsequently dropped the proceedings after entering into an EU-wide CSI agreement
with the United States. Container Security, European Union Factsheet, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/us/sum06_03/cs.pdf
[hereinafter
EU
Factsheet].
61
Evidence of the inability of most countries to “just say no” to U.S.
antiterrorism initiatives can be found in how quickly CSI was implemented. Former
Customs Commissioner Robert Bonner noted that while placing U.S. officials in a
foreign country usually would have been a slow and difficult process, CSI moved from
concept to implementation at “lightening [sic] speed.” Bonner Aug. 2002, supra note
31. Unfortunately, the speed with which CSI was rushed in place did not allow for
proper evaluation. The GAO noted that Customs implemented the program without
even having a way to measure whether they were successful in that respect—whether
CSI gave them any greater capabilities than they had before. GAO REPORT 2003,
supra note 27, at 26.
62
See Greece Signs Agreement, supra note 35.
63
After securing Pakistan’s cooperation in the War on Terror, the United
States adopted a number of provisions to reward the country for its efforts. See, e.g.,
Pakistan Emergency Economic Development and Trade Support Act, S. 1675, 107th
Cong. § 2 (2001) (authorizing the President to reduce or suspend duties on Pakistani
textiles imports if he determines, among other things, that Pakistan is incurring
“substantial economic harm” as a direct consequence of its assistance in the War on
Terror). See also Pub. L. No. 107-57, 115 Stat. 403 (authorizing the President to waive
with respect to Pakistan U.S. legal prohibitions on providing direct assistance to a
country whose “duly elected head of government was deposed by decree or military
coup”).
64
Yemen’s experience after a devastating terrorist attack is illustrative. See
supra note 59 and sources cited therein.
65
Indeed, globalization means countries suffer economically even when they
have not faced attack. Even countries that are not directly involved in a terrorist event
may expect their incomes to decline; one post-September 11 study found that decline
could amount to $75 billion per year as a result of a 1% ad valorem increase in
“frictional” (i.e., transactional) trade costs. Global Economic Prospects, supra note 56,
at 186.
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ports are less likely to face a terrorist attack in the first place,
and in any case they would be first in line when the supply
chain reopens after an attack. This provides a considerable
competitive advantage to CSI member countries. Recognizing
the distortions to trade CSI engenders, the European Union
(“EU”) Commission brought infringement proceedings against
eight member states that signed individual agreements with
the United States.66 In the Commission’s view, CSI jeopardizes
the common commercial policy by distorting competitive
conditions among EU ports.67 In short, the EU Commission
considered CSI to create unhealthy competition among EU
ports by causing shippers to divert trade from non-CSI ports to
ports within the program.68 Ultimately, to avoid the tradedistorting impact of CSI, the Commission signed its own CSI
agreement with the United States, which made all EU ports
eligible for membership.69
The CSI advantage is not granted to the “like product”
of all WTO member countries. Defining “like product” under
GATT Article I is a challenging exercise.70 Perhaps the
66

EU Factsheet, supra note 60.
Id. The top eight European ports handle 85% of Europe’s containerized
cargo bound for the United States. Id.
68
The New Zealand government appears to have reached a similar
conclusion—to avoid any competitive disadvantage to its ports, New Zealand is
reportedly working towards negotiating a nation-to-nation agreement with the United
States. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Container
Security:
Major
Initiatives
and
Related
International
Developments,
UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2004/1 (Feb. 26, 2004), at 22 [hereinafter UNCTAD Report],
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/sdtetlb20041_en.pdf.
69
The U.S.-E.U. Agreement provides “[p]articipation of Community ports in
the Container Security Initiative is necessary to avoid significant barriers to large
volumes of transatlantic trade with the United States resulting from customs control
measure in US ports.” Agreement between the European Community and the United
States of America on Intensifying and Broadening the Agreement of 28 May 1997 on
Customs Co-operation and Mutual Assistance in Custom Matters to Include Cooperation on Container Security and Related Matters, Explanatory Mem. para. 2, Jan.
22, 2004 [hereinafter U.S.-E.U. Agreement]. The Annex provides that “[r]ecognizing
that expansion of CSI should occur as quickly as possible for all ports within the
European Community where exchange of sea-container traffic with the United States
of America is more than de minimis and where certain minimum requirements are met
and where adequate inspection technology exists.” Id.
70
It is perhaps not surprising given the inherent difficulty in determining
with specificity, for example, whether dry-roasted Costa Rican coffee is “like” unroasted Venezuelan coffee. Moreover, it is in the “like product” analysis that countries
so inclined find the best opportunity for hidden discrimination. For example, imagine
that the United States wishes to disfavor Venezuela for its political and economic
policies and wants to favor Costa Rica as a counterpoint dominant actor in the region.
Some Customs official could be asked to analyze the imports of the respective countries
and imagine that it was discovered that Venezuela shipped dry roasted coffee beans
and Costa Rican exported un-roasted. The U.S. might well charge a higher tariff on
67
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simplest way to conceive of it—to borrow an idea from one
trade scholar—is to think of “likeness” as a continuum, with
“identical” merchandise at one end of the spectrum and
“different” merchandise at the other end; in between would be
The easiest analysis, not
products that are “similar.”71
surprisingly, is at the edges: Different products are not
entitled to MFN treatment, while identical products are. Thus,
the United States may assess one duty rate on unprocessed
cocoa imports from the Ivory Coast and another on chocolate
bars from Belgium because those products are “different.”
Imports of raw cocoa from both countries are “identical” and
would thus be subject to the same duty. The difficulty lies with
“similar” products. Are imports of sweetened, ground and
processed cocoa from Belgium like ground cocoa from the Ivory
Coast? The short answer is that it depends.72
Much of the wealth of GATT-WTO “like product”
jurisprudence is irrelevant in evaluating CSI’s conformity with
Article I, however. CSI does not discriminate on a productspecific but on a country-specific basis. In other words, in
treating shipments from CSI ports better than shipments from
non-CSI ports, CSI discriminates based on the origin of the
product rather than on the product itself. Thus, the question
becomes whether origin-based discrimination is permissible
under GATT Article I. The seminal case on this point is
Belgian Family Allowances.73
In 1951, Belgium found itself brought before a GATT
dispute settlement panel. Denmark and Norway objected to a
Belgian-imposed tax on imports purchased by local government

dry roasted and argue that the products are not “like” because they are not classified
under the same tariff heading, for example. See Report of the Panel, Spain – Tariff
Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, L/5135 (Apr. 27, 1981), GATT B.I.S.D. (28th Supp.)
(1981) [hereinafter Spain Tariff]. See also Report of the Panel, Treatment by Germany
of Imports of Sardines, ¶ 12, G/26 (Oct. 30, 1952), GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 57
(1953) [hereinafter German Sardines].
71
BHALA, supra note 51, at 7.
72
In GATT jurisprudence, a determination of “likeness” is made after taking
into account such factors as physical characteristics and consumer preference. See,
e.g., Spain Tariff, supra note 70. See also German Sardines, supra note 70. For a
discussion of the policy dimensions of Article I’s like product requirement, see Robert
E. Hudec, “Like Product”: The Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and III, in
REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE
LAW 101-23 (Thomas Cottier & Petros Mavroidis, eds., 2000), reproduced at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/hudeclikeproduct.pdf.
73
Report of the Panel, Belgian Family Allowances (allocations familiales),
G/32 (Nov. 7, 1952), GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 59-62 (1963) [hereinafter Belgian
Family].

406

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:2

bodies.74 The purpose of the tax was to provide a broad revenue
base to fund Belgium’s family allowance program (a
government social welfare benefit program). Rather than
imposing the tax on all imports, Belgium exempted from the
program products from countries that had a family allowance
regime similar to its own. Denmark and Norway had family
allowance programs in place and sought such an exemption,
but were denied. While both countries maintained that the
discrimination lay only in Belgium’s failure to exempt them
from application of the tax, the panel appeared to go one step
further, concluding that Belgium’s legislation was “based on a
concept which was difficult to reconcile with the spirit of the
General Agreement.” What did the “spirit” of GATT require?
[T]he Belgian legislation would have to be amended insofar as it
introduced a discrimination between countries having a given
system of family allowances and those which had a different system
or no system at all, and made the granting of the exemption
dependent on certain conditions.75

Although the panel did not arrive at a definitive ruling,
it concluded the Belgian legislation was inconsistent with the
provisions of Article I. Apparently, neither the panel nor
GATT members found this to be a conceptually difficult case.76
John H. Jackson, one of the leading scholars in the field,
characterized Belgian Family Allowances as follows:
The case can be interpreted to support the proposition that although
treatment can differ if the characteristics of goods themselves are
different, differences in treatment of imports cannot be based on
differences in characteristics of the exporting country that do not
result in differences in the goods themselves.77

Applying the panel’s determination in Belgian Family
Allowances to an evaluation of CSI, one is led to the ultimate
conclusion that the difference in treatment of developing
country imports is not based on any inherent differences in the
products themselves. Developing countries are not being
74
ROBERT HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY
135 (2d ed. 1990). For an analysis of whether Hudec got it right, see generally Steve
Charnovitz, Belgian Family Allowances and the Challenge of Origin-Based
Discrimination, 4 WORLD TRADE REV. 7 (2005).
75
Belgian Family, supra note 73, at 60.
76
The entire process from referral to the panel to the adoption of the panel
report took nine days. The panel’s report was adopted with little discussion. See
Charnovitz, supra note 74.
77
JACKSON, supra note 47, at 163.
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treated differently because their exports of bananas, lumber or
textiles are inherently more of a security risk. Rather, they
face different treatment because Customs has made the
determination initially to limit CSI membership to those
countries of strategic and economic significance to the United
States. Thus, the differing treatment afforded CSI and nonCSI goods has little to do with differences in the goods being
exported—i.e., Customs has not made the determination
(except perhaps implicitly) that goods from non-CSI members
are inherently more of a security risk than goods from CSI
members.78 Goods from CSI and non-CSI countries face
different treatment merely because Customs constructed an
implementation
schedule
that
was
administratively
convenient.
The CSI advantage is not accorded “immediately and
unconditionally” to the like product of all other WTO
members.79 Not every interested country is permitted to join
CSI. In the first phase of implementation, membership was
restricted to the top twenty megaports, which send the largest
volume of container traffic to the United States. Phase II of the
project targets ports that are of political or strategic
significance.80 These ports are asked to join CSI only if they
satisfy certain minimum standards, the most important of
which include having “regular, direct and substantial”
container traffic to the United States and having the requisite
Merely
non-intrusive inspectional equipment available.81
satisfying some of the criteria for membership does not,
however, guarantee inclusion in CSI. For example, Mexico
apparently sought membership only to be denied because it did
not have sufficient container traffic to the United States.82
Similarly, Jamaica’s port security system appeared to meet CSI
78
There is an argument to be made that goods of developing countries are not
“like products” because they are not subjected to the same domestic security controls as
are goods from CSI members. In short, the assumption is that poorer countries devote
less resources to port, container and customs’ security measures. That is, of course,
merely an assumption. Some developing countries have excellent controls. See, e.g.,
Arlene Martin-Wilkins, Jamaica’s Port Security Procedures to Be Used as World
Benchmark, JAMAICA OBSERVER, June 21, 2005, available at http://www.
jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20050620t220000-0500_82811_obs_jamaica_s_port_
security_procedures_to_be_used_as_world_benchmark.asp.
79
Canada-Autos, supra note 50.
80
CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
81
Id.
82
Trade Policy Review, Mexico Question & Answer, WT/TPR/M/97/Add.1
(June 11, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm.
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requirements, but it was not admitted into CSI until
September 2006, several years after the program became
operational.83 Developing countries for the most part are
excluded from CSI in the first two phases of implementation.
While a tiny minority of ports in developing countries
participate in CSI—Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and South Africa to
name a few—only in Phase III are significant numbers of
developing country ports considered for CSI membership.84
Thus, CSI would appear to violate Article I because it
confers benefits on some members that are not immediately
and unconditionally made available to all WTO members. It
would be difficult to forget that CSI was implemented in the
face of a pervasive fear of terrorist attack on the most
important—and perhaps most vulnerable—link in the trade
supply chain. Having concluded that CSI violates a central
tenet of the WTO Agreement, it does not automatically follow
that the multilateral system is ill-equipped to deal with
terrorism. The GATT was crafted in a time of war, and its
authors and signatories were well aware of the need for trade
rules to give way to security measures. It would have been
short-sighted indeed if the GATT had not contemplated and
made provisions for the situation where a member would have
to act to protect its national security interests, even if that
meant violating the provisions of a trade agreement.
The next section maintains that the WTO Agreement
does enable countries to deal with the single greatest threat
facing the world in the twenty-first century. GATT Article XXI
recognizes and explicitly authorizes members to take action
that would otherwise be inconsistent with their WTO
obligations if such actions are taken to protect their “essential
security interests.” Implicit in Article XXI, however, is the
recognition of a “development dimension.” What does this
development dimension entail? Can CSI be justified in light of
it?

83

See Martin-Wilkins, supra note 78.
The United States signed a
Declaration of Principle with Jamaica in June 2006, and by September 2006, Jamaica’s
Kingston port was included in CSI. See Container Security Initiative Coming to
Jamaica: Innovative CBP Program Screens Cargo for Dangerous Materials Before
Arriving in U.S. (June 20, 2006), available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/
newsroom/news_releases/062006/06202006_2.xml; see also Ports in CSI, supra note 31.
84
It is not clear when Phase III implementation will begin. While Customs
has recently admitted a handful of developing countries in CSI, it has not officially
announced commencement of Phase III. See Ports in CSI, supra note 31.
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Justifying CSI Under the National Security Exception
The Charter is long and complicated and difficult. . . . But we must
not lose sight, in all of its detail, of the deeper problems that
underlie these mysteries. For the questions with which the Charter
is really concerned are whether there is to be economic peace or
economic war, whether nations are to be drawn together or torn
apart, whether men are to have work or to be idle, whether their
families are to eat or go hungry, whether their children are to face
the future with confidence or with fear.
—Honorable William L. Clayton85

No provision of international law or the WTO
Agreement itself prevents a country from taking measures
necessary to protect its own security interests. National
security is the “Achilles’ heel of international law.”86 In any
international agreement, “the issue of national security gives
rise to some sort of loophole . . . [allowing] any nation-state to
protect itself . . . by employing otherwise unavailable means.”87
From its inception, GATT recognized the “Achilles’ heel”
of national security would require trade rules to be
subordinated to national security considerations. Article XXI
was thus adopted as a general exception allowing members to
derogate from any and all of their obligations in specific
instances of national security. But the text of Article XXI has
led to a great deal of controversy. While it unequivocally states
that “[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed . . . to
prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests,”88 the language of Article XXI nevertheless presents
some significant interpretive difficulties. The following section
addresses one of the key questions in this area: Is Article XXI
“self-judging,” thus insulating national security measures from
any possibility of review from the WTO’s dispute settlement
85

W. L. Clayton, Foreword to WILCOX, supra note 42, at ix. William Lockhart
Clayton was head of the U.S. delegation at the historic negotiations under the auspices
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, which culminated in the
signing of ITO Charter. The ITO never came into existence, primarily because
Congress refused to ratify it based on concerns from the business sector that
developing countries had too much leeway to expropriate foreign property. See Drache,
supra note 45, at 28.
86
Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff, “Constitutionalization” and
Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AM. J.
INT’L. L. 424, 426 (1999).
87
Id.
88
GATT, supra note 44, art. XXI.
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mechanism?
After reviewing relevant authority on the
question, the section then moves on to argue that even
accepting the self-judging argument, Article XXI contains a
two-fold requirement that must be satisfied if a measure is to
be consistent with its terms: proportionality and development.
In other words, Article XXI limits members to taking only
those measures that are “necessary”; this necessity obligation
can only be satisfied if the measure taken is proportionate to
the harm being addressed and does not unduly burden the
development needs of poorer developing countries.
The question of how Article XXI is to be interpreted is
not merely a technical one. In a post-September 11 world
where the War on Terror promises to be a long one, and where
the enemy has no home or well defined borders, it is of critical
importance to have a clear understanding of what is
permissible under the national security exception. Otherwise,
the security exception promises to unravel the careful balance
of rights and obligations constructed by the WTO Agreement.
1. On the Self-Judging Nature of Article XXI
In 1947, only a few short years after the restoration of
peace in Europe, and with the Continent in economic ruin,
fifty-four countries ushered in a new era of trade relations with
the signing of the Final Act of the Havana Charter for the
International Trade Organization (“ITO”).89 The unfettered
exercise of sovereign rights had only led to a political
meltdown, and in this new era, notions of sovereignty were to
be tempered with economic cooperation.
But with the memory of World War II fresh in the
delegates’ minds, the need to balance the economic
development promised by greater cooperation with national
security considerations was paramount; the clash of these
somewhat competing interests caused negotiators not
inconsiderable difficulties.90 As one U.S. delegate noted:
We gave a good deal of thought to the question of the security
exception . . . . We recognized that there was a great danger of
89
HON. JAMES G. FULTON & HON. JACOB K. JAVITS, REPORT FOR THE S.
COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 80TH CONG., THE INT’L TRADE ORG., AN APPRAISAL OF THE
HAVANA CHARTER IN RELATION TO UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, WITH A DEFINITIVE
STUDY OF ITS PROVISIONS 8 (Comm. Print 1948). Argentina and Poland were the two
lone dissenting governments who participated in the negotiations but failed to sign on
to the agreement. Id.
90
WILCOX, supra note 42, at 36.
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having too wide an exception . . . because that would permit
anything under the sun. . . . [T]here must be some latitude here for
security measures. It is really a question of balance.91

The balance struck during the ITO negotiations
ultimately led to adoption of the security exception in GATT
Article XXI, which provides:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security
interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from
which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and
implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and
materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the
purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations;
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in
pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for
the maintenance of international peace and security.92

The greatest cause of debate and consternation, and the
section most invoked by far, has been section (b) (iii). The
question surrounding Article XXI (b) (iii) has been exactly who
is allowed to interpret its terms? Despite the wealth of
competing arguments, a review of relevant authority—GATT
practice and GATT/WTO jurisprudence—fails to yield a
definitive answer.
a. Reviewing Relevant Authority
Despite the apparent open-ended language of Article
XXI—or perhaps because of it—the national security exception

91
Quoted in ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 600 (6th
ed. 1995) [hereinafter GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX].
92
GATT, supra note 88, art. XXI (emphasis added).
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has rarely been invoked by WTO members.93 This surprising
restraint evidences WTO members’ recognition that with
93
No Article XXI cases have gone to dispute settlement under the WTO
system. The European Union did raise a claim against the United States’ Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C §§ 6021-6091 (better known as
the Helms-Burton Act), which penalized foreign companies “trafficking” in property
formerly owned by U.S. citizens that had been expropriated by the Cuban government
during the revolution. Given the sensitive nature of U.S.-Cuban relations in the WTO,
the United States has refused all dealings with the communist government. Should
the matter have proceeded to dispute settlement, the United States undoubtedly would
have invoked Article XXI. The parties ultimately reached a negotiated solution
without resort to the WTO’s formal dispute mechanism.
Resolution on the
Negotiations Between the Commission and the U.S. Administration on the HelmsBurton Act, June 10, 1997, 1997 OJ (C 304) 116.
Under the old GATT system, only a handful of matters concerning Article
XXI were ever notified or addressed by the Contracting Parties:

1. United States–Czechoslovakia (1949): Czechoslovakia sought GATT
action on a U.S. export control licensing scheme, which prevented the export
of certain goods to Czechoslovakia. The Czech government brought its
complaint under GATT Articles I and XXI, but its claim was ultimately
rejected by the GATT panel. GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 91, at 602.
2. Ghana–Portugal (1961): Ghana imposed a total ban on trade with
Portugal at the latter’s accession to the GATT claiming Portugal’s support of
the war in Angola constituted a potential threat to the peace of the African
continent. Any action which might pressure the Portuguese Government into
lessening this danger was justified in the essential security interest of
Ghana. GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 91, at 600.
3. United States–Cuba (1962): The United States imposed an embargo on
trade with Cuba a few years after the Cuban Revolution and justified the
measure as a matter of national security. GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra
note 91, at 605.
4. Sweden (global measure) (1975): Sweden imposed quota restrictions on
certain footwear imported from any GATT contracting party claiming
essentially that decreasing domestic production of footwear threatened its
security by calling into question Sweden’s ability to outfit its military:
[The] decrease in domestic production [of footwear] has become a
critical threat to the emergency planning of Sweden’s economic
defence . . . necessitat[ing] the maintenance of a minimum domestic
production capacity in vital industries . . . to secure the provision of
essential products necessary to meet basic needs in case of war or
other emergency in international relations.
GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 91, at 603. The GATT Contracting
Parties, we are told, “expressed doubts as to the justification of these
measures under the General Agreement.” Id.
5. European Community–Argentina (1982): The EC as well as its member
states, along with Canada and Australia, suspended imports from Argentina
in retaliation for Argentinean armed intervention in the Falkland/Malvinas
Islands.
Argentina was ultimately successful in getting the GATT
Contracting Parties to issue an interpretation of Article XXI, which provided
in part that “the contracting parties undertake, individually and
jointly: . . . to abstain from taking restrictive trade measures, for reasons of a
non-economic character, not consistent with the General Agreement.” GATT
ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 91, at 603 (alteration in original). The
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liberal use, Article XXI could easily evolve into “the exception
that swallowed GATT.”94 But its limited explicit use in practice
has not prevented controversy from swirling around Article
XXI almost from its adoption.
As the dominant users of Article XXI, developed
countries take a decidedly “hands off” approach to the
interpretation of the national security exception.95 As early as
1949, in the first dispute involving Article XXI, the United
States insisted that the security exception was “a virtually
unlimited escape clause, controlled only by the general policy
notion that the GATT system should not be undermined

Contracting Parties additionally adopted notification requirements for
measures taken pursuant to GATT Article XXI. See Decision Concerning
Article XXI of the General Agreement, L/5426 (Nov. 30, 1982), GATT B.I.S.D.
(29th Supp.), at 23 (1982).
6. United States–Nicaragua (1985): The United States notified the GATT
contracting parties of its imposition of a trade embargo on Nicaraguan
exports several years after the populist Sandinista National Liberation Front
(Frente Sandinista de Liberación or FSLN) took control of the government.
GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 91, at 603. For further discussion of
the dispute, see text and footnotes supra section II.B.
7. European Communities–Yugoslavia (1992): The EC and its member
states revoked Yugoslavia’s preferential access to the EC market—citing
Article XXI—in an effort to force a peaceful solution to the Yugoslavian
conflict. Yugoslavia protested, arguing that its situation was “a specific one
[that] does not correspond to the . . . meaning of Article XXI(b) and (c).”
GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 91, at 604. The GATT Council
established a dispute panel to examine the EC’s action, pursuant to a request
from Yugoslavia. Id. But with the dissolution of Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, the Article XXI dispute was superceded by events, and the
matter quickly devolved into a discussion of whether the newly reconstituted
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro) could
participate in GATT as the successor nation. Id. at 604-05.
These seven matters listed above will be referred to hereinafter as “Article XXI
Measures in GATT Practice.”
94
RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GATT-WTO
SYSTEM, REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND U.S. LAW 157 (1998). No Article XXI disputes
have been adjudicated under the WTO system, and only a handful of such measures
were ever notified to the GATT. See supra note 93. But the controversy surrounding
Article XXI meant that GATT members often chose not to notify their security
measures to the GATT but rather to implicitly rely on the security exception. See
generally Wesley Cann, Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the WTO
Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a
New Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilaterism, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 413 (2001).
In 1982, at the instigation of Argentina, the GATT Contracting Parties adopted
provisions requiring notification of such measures. Decision Concerning Article XXI of
the General Agreement, supra note 93, at 23.
95
But see supra note 93 (Ghana’s invocation of Article XXI to justify a total
ban on Portuguese goods).
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through the use of the security exception.”96 When GATT
members subsequently discussed the United Kingdom’s trade
embargo on Argentina in retaliation for its armed intervention
in the Falkland Islands, the United States again declared that
“the General Agreement left to each contracting party the
judgment as to what it considered to be necessary to protect its
security interests. The [Contracting Parties] had no power to
The UK echoed that view,
question that judgment.”97
maintaining that “[t]he exercise of these rights constituted a
general exception to the GATT and ‘required neither
notification, justification, nor approval.’”98
By and large, developing countries reject the notion of a
self-judged security exception.99 There have been no WTO
disputes involving Article XXI and little in the way of GATT
While the
jurisprudence to resolve the matter.100
preponderance of scholarly writing has rejected the notion that
Article XXI is self-judging, some scholars disagree.101
Regardless of the merits of either position, a definitive view on
the interpretation of Article XXI, at least with respect to its
self-judging character, is beyond the scope of this article.
Rather, this article seeks to make a more fundamental point:
No matter who gets to interpret it, the WTO Agreement
contains requirements on how the national security exception
should be applied. The question of whether Article XXI is self96
Hahn, supra note 48, at 569. The dispute was brought by Czechoslovakia
against the United States for the imposition of a discriminatory export licensing
scheme that prohibited exportation of certain key products to the then Communist
state.
97
Quoted in BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 94, at 157.
98
Hahn, supra note 48, at 574.
99
But see Ghana’s invocation of Article XXI to justify its trade embargo
against Portugal, supra note 93. Ghana specifically argued that “under this Article
each contracting party was the sole judge of what was necessary in its essential
security interest.” GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 91, at 600.
100
See supra note 93. In Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua, The International Court of Justice had an opportunity to examine the U.S.
trade embargo against Nicaragua. In doing so, it compared the language found in
GATT Article XXI with the language contained in article XXI of the 1956 Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and Nicaragua.
Ultimately, the ICJ concluded:

After examining the available material, particularly the Executive Order of
President Reagan of 1 May 1985, the Court finds that the mining of
Nicaraguan ports, and the direct attacks on ports and oil installations, and
the general trade embargo of 1 May 1985, cannot be justified as necessary to
protect the essential security interests of the United States.
Military And Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
101
See generally Cann, supra note 94.
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judging reduces the focus to only one portion—the “it”
element—of the Article XXI analysis (“Nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed . . . to prevent any contracting
party from taking any action which it considers
necessary . . . .”).
Left out of the analysis is an equally
compelling question: How should the term “necessary” be
defined? Addressing that question, however, requires an initial
examination of the critical assumption underlying the selfjudging debate—the belief that without an enforcement
mechanism, no requirements or obligations can exist.
b. A “Right Without a Remedy?”
Implicit in the self-judging/non-self-judging debate is
the assumption that without recourse to a coercive dispute
settlement mechanism, a country against whom an Article XXI
measure has been imposed has no hope of influencing the way
in which the country taking such action chooses to impose it.
In short, both proponents and opponents subscribe to the
maxim of ubi jus ibi remedium—there is no right without a
remedy.102
International legal scholarship is rich in theoretical and
empirical analyses of state compliance with international
obligations and norms in the absence of enforcement
mechanisms. What emerges is an understanding that states
uphold their obligations for reasons other than mere coercion.103
Enforcement in international law is always a challenge given
the continuing preeminence of sovereignty. But even in the
absence of enforcement, international law imposes on states a
duty to carry out their treaty obligations in good faith104—
102

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *23.
See, e.g., Omar M. Dajani, Shadow or Shade: The Roles of International
Law in Palestinian-Israeli Peace Talks, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. ___ (forthcoming 2007;
manuscript on file with author) (maintaining that “international law may exert
influence not only as a result of the shadow it casts over bargaining, but also by virtue
of the shade it offers—that is, its perceived value, independent of the threat of
enforcement, as an objective and legitimate standard for resolving disputed issues”).
See also Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early
Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 158, 163-64 (2000) (noting
that “[n]either GATT nor the WTO possess centralized enforcement power, the upshot
being that both have relied on the complainant itself to implement any retaliatory
measures that may be authorized. . . . [T]his threat [of such enforcement alone] is
obviously insufficient to induce [concessions] in the majority of cases . . . .”).
104
The doctrine of pacta sunt servanda holds that “Every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available
103
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indeed, states must refrain from acts that would defeat the
object and purpose of the treaty even before it is ratified.105
Thus, under the WTO’s “single undertaking,”106 members are
bound by all WTO rules not because there is some coercive
force compelling compliance but because they undertook those
obligations in good faith.
There is much to suggest that this good faith
presumption is well founded. The trillions of dollars of world
trade that takes place every day, 98% of which is covered by
the WTO Agreement, has led to only a handful of disputes since
1995.107 Many of those have been resolved at the consultations
stage between members, never giving rise to an actual
dispute.108 Thus, most of the time most members act in
accordance with most of their WTO obligations. And in
instances where at least one side has perceived that a
member’s action was inconsistent with its obligations, the
disputing parties were able to come to a negotiated settlement.
These accommodations and negotiated agreements are possible
because states find some benefit in complying with their
at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
105
Vienna Convention, supra note 104, art. 18.
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the
treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made
its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry
into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly
delayed.
Id.
106
The WTO noted: “It is now well established that the WTO Agreement is a
‘single undertaking’ and therefore all WTO obligations are generally cumulative and
Members must comply with all of them simultaneously unless there is a formal
‘conflict’ between them.” Report of the Panel, Korea − Definitive Safeguard Measure on
Imports of Certain Dairy Products, ¶ 7.38, WT/DS98/R (June 21, 1999).
107
Dispute Settlement Body Overview, Update of WTO Dispute Settlement
Cases, WT/DS/OV/26 (Mar. 1, 2006). The WTO has been notified to date of 335
requests for consultations; 110 of these cases have adopted the Appellate Body, Panel,
or Panel Compliance Reports. Id.
108
Of the 335 requests for consultations, fifty resulted in “Mutually Agreed
Solutions,” twenty-nine became “Inactive” (terminated, panel request withdrawn, etc.),
sixteen resulted in “Arbitrations on Level of Suspension of Concessions” (pursuant to
arbitration proceedings under Articles 22.6 and 22.7 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the
Subsidies agreement), and fifteen were given “WTO Authorizations of Suspension of
Concessions” (pursuant to Article 22.7 of the DSU and 4.10 of the Subsidies
Agreement). Id.
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obligations (or not breaching them in the first instance) that
has little to do with a dispute settlement mechanism.
Professor Hudec’s famous study, though now somewhat
dated, bears out this conclusion at least in part. Evaluating
state compliance with GATT panel reports, Hudec found that
at a time when few penalties attached and few enforcement
mechanisms existed, contracting parties largely complied with
their GATT obligations.109 That outcome is not surprising
considering that for nearly thirty years GATT was a
“diplomatic” system, one of the hallmarks of which was the
critical need for cooperation among members in order for
decisions to be taken.110 Despite the shift in 1995 from a
diplomatic to a rules-based system, cooperation remains the
hallmark of WTO decision-making. For example, consensus
rather than majority voting remains the norm in the WTO;
thus, if even one member protests, consensus is not reached
and action normally will not be taken.111 The need for
consensus voting is perhaps one explanation as to why
countries would comply with their obligations in the absence of
an effective enforcement mechanism.
There is of course some basis for holding the competing
viewpoint that states will not act unless forced to do so.
Certainly the WTO currently is in an implementation crisis: In
several controversial and high profile cases, members—mainly
109

HUDEC, ENFORCING TRADE LAW, supra note 47, at 6.
Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An
Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 4 (1999). Hudec claims:
110

[D]uring the first thirty years of GATT history, roughly 1948-1978, the GATT
disputes procedure did exhibit a distinctly diplomatic character.
Its
operating procedures were quite ill-defined, its legal rulings were written in
vague language that suggested more than it said, and both its procedures and
its rulings left plenty of room for negotiation. In 1970, the artful ambiguity of
this early GATT procedure led this author to christen its methods “A
Diplomat’s Jurisprudence.”
Id. He went on to note:
After 1980, the GATT dispute settlement procedure transformed itself into an
institution based primarily on the authority of legal obligation. The GATT
procedure’s transformation into a more “judicial” or “juridical” instrument
was not only remarkable in its own right, but more important to our present
subject, the development of these legal powers and their general acceptance
by GATT governments laid the essential foundation for even stronger legal
powers that followed under the WTO.
Id.
111
For further discussion on the WTO’s consensus voting methods, see, for
example, Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26
(2005).
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the United States and, to a lesser extent, the European
Union—have refused to implement cases they have lost.112
Even more to the point is the U.S.–Nicaragua Article XXI
dispute.113 In that case, the United States imposed a trade
embargo on Nicaragua in retaliation for the communist
government’s “policies and practices,” which allegedly
constituted an extraordinary threat to American security.114
After having a difficult time securing authorization to establish
a dispute settlement panel,115 Nicaragua ultimately received
little for its trouble. The panel made no ruling on Nicaragua’s
allegation that the U.S. embargo, even if justified under Article
XXI, nullified or impaired benefits accruing to it under the
GATT. The panel based its determination not on the legal
merits of Nicaragua’s position, but on its determination that no
adequate countermeasures could be authorized to Nicaragua
should it prevail on its claim. In short, the panel declined to
address the question of whether Nicaragua’s rights had been

112
See, e.g., United States − Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations –
Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities,
WT/DS108/AB/RW2 (Feb. 13, 2006); U.S. − Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005); United States − Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/13 (Aug. 19, 2005); United States
− Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC − Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/1
(Nov. 10, 2004).
113
U.S.-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, supra note 48.
114
Executive Order 12513 reads:

I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, find that the
policies and actions of the Government of Nicaragua constitute an unusual
and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the
United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that
threat.
I hereby prohibit all imports into the United States of goods and services of
Nicaraguan origin; all exports from the United States of goods to or destined
for Nicaragua, except those destined for the organized democratic resistance,
and transactions relating thereto.
Quoted in U.S.-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, supra note 48. The Reagan
Administration was later to run into trouble for trading arms for hostages in order to
support the Sandinistas, the so-called “organized democratic resistance.” See generally
H. REP. NO. 433, S. REP. NO. 216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Report of the
Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair).
115
The United States made the now familiar argument that its actions were
covered under Article XXI:(b)(iii) and that “[a] panel could therefore not address the
validity of, nor the motivation for, the United States’ invocation of Article XXI:(b)(iii).”
U.S.-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, supra note 48, at 1. Nicaragua was
ultimately successful in getting a panel established, but at the insistence of the United
States the terms of reference specifically precluded the Panel from examining or
judging the validity of or motivation for U.S. invocation of Article XXI:(b)(iii). Id. at 12. At the time, establishment of a panel was not an automatic right.
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violated precisely because it concluded there would be no way
to remedy the situation:
The Panel noted that, under the embargo . . . not only imports from
Nicaragua into the United States were prohibited but also exports
from the United States to Nicaragua. In these circumstances, a
suspension of obligations by Nicaragua towards the United States
could not alter the balance of advantages accruing to the two
contracting parties under the General Agreement in Nicaragua’s
favour.
The Panel noted that the United States had stated that an
authorization permitting Nicaragua to suspend obligations towards
the United States “would be of no consequence in the present case
because the embargo had already cut off all trade relations between
the United States and Nicaragua” and that Nicaragua had agreed
that “a recommendation by the Panel that Nicaragua be authorized
to withdraw its concessions in respect of the United States would
indeed be a meaningless step because of the two-way embargo.”
The Panel therefore had to conclude that, even if it were found that
the embargo nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Nicaragua
independent of whether or not it was justified under Article XXI, the
CONTRACTING PARTIES could, in the circumstances of the present
case, take no decision ... that would re-establish the balance of
advantages which had accrued to Nicaragua under the General
Agreement prior to the embargo” …
In the light of the foregoing considerations the Panel decided not to
propose a ruling this case on the basic question of whether actions
under Article XXI could nullify or impair GATT benefits of the
adversely affected contracting party.116

But if U.S.–Nicaragua illustrates anything, it is that
dispute settlement in the area of national security simply will
not work—particularly in a superpower versus developing
country “showdown.”117 Despite the lack of available recourse
to dispute settlement, however, less powerful developing
countries have managed to obtain some benefits within the
trading system, including, for example, adoption of the
Generalized System of Preferences and other “special and
differential rights.”118

116

Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
Indeed, for developing countries dispute settlement has not been an
effective tool. See, e.g., Communication from Nicaragua, United States-Trade Measures
Affecting Nicaragua, L/5847 (July 15, 1985). See also Victor Mosoti, Africa in the First
Decade of WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 J. INT’L ECON. LAW 427 (2006), available at
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/9/2/427.
118
See, e.g., GATT, supra note 44, pt. IV.
117
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The greatest refutation of the position of proponents of
the “no right without a remedy” argument has been the
evolution of Article XXI itself. Beginning as it did with the
general premise that the national security exception required
“neither notification, justification, nor approval,” the position of
developed countries has shifted significantly—or, more
accurately, GATT/WTO practice has changed.
Where
developed countries once argued that Article XXI required no
notification, GATT members adopted the Understanding on
Article XXI, which specifically requires notification.119 Where
developed countries once argued that no justification is
required under Article XXI, in fact the practice has been to
provide some sort of justification.120 With respect to CSI, as
described further below, the United States has provided a full
explanation for taking action.121 And finally, where developed
countries once argued that Article XXI required no approval, in
practice they have lobbied for such approval. In at least one
instance, the U.S.–Czechoslovakia 1949 Article XXI dispute,
GATT approval was explicitly forthcoming.122 But even without
a panel determination, members imposing Article XXI
measures seek approval at least from their allies. In the
European Community–Argentina matter, for example, the
United Kingdom sought “approval” and support from its allies,
and the Article XXI measure was imposed not only by the
European Community but also by Canada and Australia.123
Thus, even accepting the argument that Article XXI
measures are self-judging and therefore ultimately are not
subject to evaluation by any dispute settlement body, one is

119
Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement, L/5426 (Dec. 2,
1982), GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 23 (1983). “The Contracting Parties decide that:
(1) Subject to the exception in Article XXI:a, contracting parties should be informed to
the fullest extent possible of trade measures taken under Article XXI.” Id. (emphasis
added).
120
Article XXI Measures in GATT Practice, supra note 93.
121
In this instance, the United States took pains to explain the measure and
its rationale, rather than merely imposing it. See, e.g., Trade Policy Review, Mexico
Question & Answer, supra note 82.
122
Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting: Held at Hotel Verdun,
Annecy, at 9, GATT/CP.3/SR.22 (June 8, 1949), available at http://gatt.stanford.edu/
bin/object.pdf?90060100. The summary notes: “The Chairman, however, was of the
opinion that . . . the United States Government had defended its actions under Articles
XX and XXI which embodied exceptions to the general rule contained in Article I.” Id.
A vote by roll-call resulted in one affirmative (Czechoslovakia), seventeen negatives,
three abstentions, and two absent votes, approving the U.S.’s use of Article XXI. Id.
123
GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 91, at 603.
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still left with the question of whether such measures must
conform to any WTO obligations at all, and if so, what?
2. The “Development Dimension”: Interpreting Article
XXI’s Necessity Obligation
A WTO member is not authorized under Article XXI to
take any action it chooses in the name of national security. By
its terms, the security exception limits the available response
to those actions that are necessary. What are the limits of this
necessity requirement?
The argument to be developed below maintains that the
“necessary” language of Article XXI cannot be read in isolation.
The WTO Appellate Body has long relied on the interpretive
rule of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which states that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.”124 When the necessity obligation is so
read, it becomes clear that a measure is “necessary” if and only
if it is proportionate to the harm faced by the invoking country
and that the measure does not unduly burden the development
objectives of vulnerable developing countries.
Even if the text of Article XXI itself does not suggest a
broader interpretive reading, general norms of equity and
fairness, along with the nature of this new War on Terror—a
war without an end date against an enemy without
geographical boundaries—calls for a reinterpretation. Article
XXI surely could not have been intended to allow a member to

124
Vienna Convention, supra note 104, art. 31. In United States – Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp And Shrimp Products, the Appellate Body concluded:

The Panel did not follow all of the steps of applying the “customary rules of
interpretation of public international law” as required by Article 3.2 of the
DSU. As we have emphasized numerous times, these rules call for an
examination of the ordinary meaning of the words of a treaty, read in their
context, and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty involved. A
treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular
provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision,
read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the
treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is
equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the
reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the
treaty as a whole may usefully be sought.
Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, ¶ 114, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle].
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reconfigure the world trade order in such a way as to unduly
burden and penalize the most vulnerable members.
a. Proportionality
It is by now well established in WTO jurisprudence that
as an exception to the general treaty obligations of the WTO
Agreement, Article XXI is to be narrowly construed.125 Thus,
the apparently expansive language that would allow a member
to take “any measure” must be constrained by certain core or
fundamental principles of international law, one of which is the
principle of proportionality. As one court notes, the principle of
proportionality requires that “the application of . . . rules . . .
must be appropriate for securing attainment of the objective
which they pursue and must not go beyond what is necessary
in order to attain it.”126 In short, the basic premise underlying
the proportionality principle is that the punishment must fit
the crime; one is justified in responding to an attack, but both
the means employed to respond and the level of the response
must be calibrated to the harm actually suffered. Or, to use
less war-and-crime laden language, the means employed to
address a problem must be appropriate for securing the
objective and cannot go beyond what is necessary to attain it.
The proportionality principle is central to an analysis of
Article XXI because it establishes limits on the type, manner
and amount of the countermeasure a member may take to
protect its essential security interests. But, as with most
interpretations of the provisions of Article XXI, the
proportionality principle applied in this context is not without
controversy.
One could make the argument that a
125
See, e.g., Report of the Panel, Japan − Restrictions on Imports of Certain
Agricultural Products, L/6253 (Feb. 2, 1988), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp) at 163 (1989).
The United States argued that “[a]ny exceptions to the ban on quantitative restrictions
had to be construed as narrowly as possible, and all criteria for such an exception had
to be met.” Id. ¶ 3.2.2. The panel concurred, noting:

In order for an import restriction to be justified under Article XI:2(c)(i) all of
the conditions noted above must be fulfilled. Therefore, in those cases in
which the Panel found that one condition was not met, it did not consider it
necessary to examine the restriction further in the light of the other
conditions.
Id. ¶ 5.3. See also Report of the Panel, European Economic Community − Restrictions
on Imports of Apples, L/6513 (June 22, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 135
(1989).
126
The European Court of Justice also employs the principle of proportionality
in its jurisprudence. See, e.g., Case C-58/98, Corsten, 2000 E.C.R. I-7919, I-7957.
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proportionality analysis is not relevant to an interpretation of
Article XXI. The national security exception is unlike GATT’s
other general exception—Article XX’s health, safety and morals
exception—which specifically recognizes a “least trade
restrictive” limitation.127 But that argument merely re-engages
127

The chapeau to GATT Article XX specifically provides:

Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of
measures.
GATT, supra note 44, art. XX. The Appellate Body has interpreted that language as
follows:
Turning then to the chapeau of Article XX, we consider that it embodies the
recognition on the part of WTO Members of the need to maintain a balance of
rights and obligations between the right of a Member to invoke one or
another of the exceptions of Article XX, specified in paragraphs (a) to (j), on
the one hand, and the substantive rights of the other Members under the
GATT 1994, on the other hand. Exercise by one Member of its right to invoke
an exception, such as Article XX(g), if abused or misused, will, to that extent,
erode or render naught the substantive treaty rights in, for example, Article
XI:1, of other Members. Similarly, because the GATT 1994 itself makes
available the exceptions of Article XX, in recognition of the legitimate nature
of the policies and interests there embodied, the right to invoke one of those
exceptions is not to be rendered illusory. The same concept may be expressed
from a slightly different angle of vision, thus, a balance must be struck
between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and
the duty of that same Member to respect the treaty rights of the other
Members. To permit one Member to abuse or misuse its right to invoke an
exception would be effectively to allow that Member to degrade its own treaty
obligations as well as to devalue the treaty rights of other Members. If the
abuse or misuse is sufficiently grave or extensive, the Member, in effect,
reduces its treaty obligation to a merely facultative one and dissolves its
juridical character, and, in so doing, negates altogether the treaty rights of
other Members. The chapeau was installed at the head of the list of “General
Exceptions” in Article XX to prevent such far-reaching consequences.
Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 124, ¶ 156.
Article XXI lacks the explicit tempered language to be found in Article XX,
but the argument developed here would implicitly draw in to Article XXI, the
jurisprudence the Appellate Body has developed with regard to Article XX. See, e.g.,
Rene E. Browne, Note, Revisiting “National Security” in an Interdependent World: The
GATT Article XXI Defense After Helms-Burton, 86 GEO. L.J. 405, 423-24 (1997)
(arguing “[b]ecause Article XX also describes ‘exceptions’ that justify trade restrictive
measures under GATT, it is the section of the agreement most analogous to Article
XXI. It would seem reasonable—in the absence of any decisions pertinent to the
security exceptions and considering Article XXI’s proximity and substantive similarity
to Article XX—for a panel reviewing Article XXI to consider Article XX decisions.”).
Browne goes on to argue for the incorporation of Article XX’s “least trade restrictive
measure” requirement into Article XXI:
A similar construction applied to Article XXI would allow parties to
determine their own security interests, just as parties determine their own
domestic environmental or public health policies. When these policies have
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the self-judging/non-self-judging debate: There is no question
that Article XX allows a panel to make the assessment of
whether a measure is proportionate—i.e., least trade
restrictive. But arguing that a panel cannot make a similar
assessment with respect to Article XXI is not to say that Article
XXI does not, nevertheless, require a measured response to a
national security emergency.
Admittedly, however, some
countries have tried to make the claim for a proportionality
standard in Article XXI, with little success.128 But in the case of
CSI, whether the measure applied must conform to some
standard of proportionality is a less difficult legal hurdle given
the United States appears to acknowledge, at least tacitly, the
need for such a standard.129 In the WTO’s 2005 review of U.S.
trade policies, the European Union and the United States
exchanged the following set of questions and answers:
Question: (EU #3)
What procedures does the U.S. have in place to ensure that the
principle of proportionality/least trade restrictiveness and nondiscrimination have been adequately observed in the development of
new proposals and new measures to increase security against future
terrorist attacks? Have there been any risk analyses undertaken or
studies into the likely impact on trade flows of specific measures?
Answer: (United States)
CBP has numerous layers of targeting and risk management tools in
place to assist in making decisions concerning threat assessments.
By using advance information, risk management and technology,
and by partnering with other nations and with the private sector,
extraterritorial effect that impairs other parties’ rights under GATT,
however, the party invoking the exception would have to demonstrate that no
alternative measures consistent with the GATT, or less inconsistent with it,
are available to achieve these essential security objectives.
Id. at 426. But see Raj Bhala, Fighting Bad Guys With International Trade Law, 31
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) (concluding “[t]he first feature of article XXI is that it is
an all-embracing exception to GATT obligations. This point is evident from the first
word of the article: ‘nothing.’ Once a WTO Member relies on article XXI to implement
a measure against another Member, the sanctioning Member need not adhere to any
GATT obligations toward the target Member.”).
128
In the United States – Nicaragua dispute, for example, some countries
maintained that U.S. action was disproportionate, but the issue was not addressed by
the GATT panel. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Minutes of Meeting Held in
the Centre William Rappard on 29 May 1985, C/M/188 (June 28, 1985), available at
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91150029.pdf.
129
Question to the United States from the European Union during TPRM:
United States – Trade Policy Review Body – Minutes of Meeting – Addendum, at 31-32,
WT/TPR/M/126/Add.3 (Nov. 22, 2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/tpr_e/tpr_e.htm.
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the twin goals of the United States of enhanced security and trade
facilitation do not have to be mutually exclusive. Since 9-11, we have
developed ways to make our borders more secure that also ensure
the efficient flow of legitimate trade and travel.130

In the case of a War on Terror, the need for security
measures to be informed by a proportionality analysis becomes
even more important. The current war is being fought without
a timetable for completion, and while the objective is to protect
U.S. interests from stateless enemies, the means employed to
achieve that objective very directly impact state actors. In
short, CSI adversely impacts some WTO member countries—
and will continue to do so for some time—despite the fact that
those members are not the cause of the harm.
While
recognizing that “collateral damage” in wartime is inevitable,
the damage inflicted must meet some minimum standards of
decency and fair play. Adopting a proportionality analysis in
Article XXI measures would achieve that equitable objective.
Merely adopting a proportionality element would not,
however, be sufficient. While constraining the actions of
stateless terrorists is the objective or the ends sought, the
means the United States has used to achieve that objective—
the Container Security Initiative—has great repercussions for
developing countries, most of whom are no more than innocent
bystanders in the War on Terror. Thus, to address that
imbalance requires not just an application of the
proportionality principle—balancing means and ends—but it
also requires a deliberate, self-conscious recognition of the need
to protect the interests of developing countries.
b. Development
Some have maintained that “there is no distinction in
international law between developed and developing countries
in matters of security.”131 The basic assumption underlying
that statement is that when national security considerations
are implicated, a country is authorized to take any action
necessary for its own protection regardless of the adverse
impact such action could have on developing countries; in
130

Id.
Statement of the United States Delegate Before the GATT Council,
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Minutes of Meeting held in the Centre
William Rappard on 29 June 1982, at 19, C/M/159 (Aug. 10, 1982), available at
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90440048.pdf [hereinafter Statement of
U.S. Delegate Before the GATT Council].
131
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short, national security concerns trump all other considerations
and allow a member to take a measure at any cost. But taking
a measure at any cost is exactly what Article XXI and the WTO
Agreement are meant to prevent. Indeed, it is the foundational
principle of the trading system that “if each of us insists on
retaining freedom to take action without first considering how
it would affect our neighbors, we shall provoke bad feeling,
retaliation, and economic war.”132
While it is true that Article XXI makes no mention of
developed or developing countries, a proper interpretation of
the national security exception prohibits one from reading that
provision in isolation; the text must be read in context in light
of the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement.133 When read
accordingly, it becomes clear that there is a recognized
distinction in international trade law between developed and
developing countries, and that developed countries have a
special duty of care when implementing measures that may
harm developing countries.
That “context” of Article XXI necessarily includes other
provisions of the WTO Agreement.
The most relevant
provision on the duty of care developed countries owe to more
economically vulnerable members is GATT Article XXXVII:3(c),
which requires developed countries to:
Have special regard to the trade interests of less-developed parties
when considering the application of other measures permitted under
this Agreement to meet particular problems and explore all
possibilities of constructive remedies before applying such measures
when they would affect essential interests of those contracting
members.134

And certainly the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement
would not support the proposition that there are no differences
between developed and developing countries in matters of
security.135
132

WILCOX, supra note 42, at 218.
Vienna Convention, supra note 104, art. 31. In United States − Trade
Measures Affecting Nicaragua, supra note 93, the panel concluded that “article xxi
could not be read in isolation and is part of legal text with which it must be reconciled.”
See also Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 124.
134
GATT, supra note 44, art. XXXVII:3(c) (emphasis added).
135
The WTO Agreement contains a number of provisions on “special and
differential rights” treating developing countries different from—and better than—
developed countries. In particular, Part IV of the GATT “recall[s] that the basic
objectives of this Agreement include the raising of standards of living and the
progressive development of the economies of all contracting parties, and considering
that the attainment of these objectives is particularly urgent for less-developed
133
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Thus, inherent in the right of members to take action to
protect their security interests is the concomitant obligation of
developed countries not to act in ways that would unduly harm
the development objectives of developing countries. The idea
that Article XXI measures must not be used in ways to harm
poorer countries’ development objectives is not novel, and it has
long been advocated by developing countries themselves.136
What is novel is that the War on Terror presents us with an
explicit illustration of why the adoption of a development
standard in Article XXI is necessary. In all previous Article
XXI measures except Swedish Footwear, the member invoking
the action did not adopt a global measure;137 the trade
prohibition was always targeted at one specific country. And in
all instances except Swedish Footwear, the member invoking
Article XXI took action because of some transgression the
country on the receiving end was alleged to have committed
that threatened the national security of the imposing state. In
short, past national security actions were almost always
retaliatory measures limited to one country. But developing
countries that are being burdened by CSI are not the source of
the harm CSI is meant to address. Rather than protecting
their interests, CSI imposes additional burdens on developing
countries.
One such burden is the 24-Hour Rule, which applies to
all U.S. trading partners. The 24-Hour Rule enables Customs
officials to gather and process information in order to target
high risk shipments.138 The need for information gathered
under the 24-Hour Rule came about only after Customs had
conceived and begun to implement CSI.139 Once it established
contracting parties.” Id. art. XXXVI:1(a). It goes on to authorize—indeed implore—
developed countries to derogate from the rules to the benefit of developing countries:
The developed contracting parties shall to the fullest extent possible—that
is, except when compelling reasons, which may include legal reasons, make it
impossible—give effect to the following provisions:
(b) refrain from introducing, or increasing the incidence of, customs duties or
non-tariff import barriers on products currently or potentially of particular
export interest to less-developed contracting parties.
Id. art. XXXVII(b).
136
See, e.g., Cann, supra note 101.
137
Article XXI Measures in GATT Practice, supra note 93.
138
19 C.F.R. § 4.7(b)(2) (2002) [hereinafter 24-Hour Rule].
139
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-557, CONTAINER SECURITY: A
FLEXIBLE STAFFING MODEL AND MINIMUM EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS WOULD
IMPROVE OVERSEAS TARGETING AND INSPECTION EFFORTS (Apr. 2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05557.pdf.
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the first CSI-port in Rotterdam, Customs realized that legal
and logistical problems prevented it from having access to data
it needed to effectively pre-screen containers.140 Rather than
implementing a rule that would require only CSI members to
provide the required data, Customs adopted the 24-Hour Rule,
which would apply to CSI and non-CSI members alike.141
The Rule requires all exporters to file an electronic
cargo manifest declaration form twenty-four hours prior to
loading a container either bound for the United States or
transiting through its borders.142 Implementation of the 24Hour Rule is a significant obstacle for developing countries.
Despite massive resistance from the trading community,
Customs declared victory, claiming that there have been “no
serious problems” in implementing the 24-Hour Rule’s
requirements.143 But that determination rests on the claim that
no legitimate exports were turned away or delayed as a result
of the Rule.144 Even if true, the real impact of the 24-Hour Rule
goes far beyond whether countries were ultimately successful
in getting their goods past Customs. Measuring the real
impact of the 24-Hour Rule must include an examination of the
rule’s implementation costs as well as the disproportionate
impact on the goods of developing countries.145 When those
140

See GAO REPORT 2003, supra note 27, at 18.
Id. at 7.
142
CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
143
In a 2003 speech, Commissioner Bonner derided doomsday predictions and
declared victory in implementing CSI and the 24-Hour Rule:
141

We heard nightmarish tales about how the 24-hour rule would paralyze
maritime trade and put companies out of business. We heard that companies
would not be ably to comply. So what have we found since February 2, when
we started enforcing compliance with the rule? We’ve found that none of
these doomsday predictions have come to pass. . . . Let me make this clear to
you: through the 24-hour rule and the Container Security Initiative (CSI)—
we are identifying shipments that pose potential threats. These programs
are working.
Bonner 2003, supra note 11. But in the same speech, Bonner himself acknowledges
some implementation problems: “Compliance with the new rule is high, and the
number of disruptions is low.” Id.
144
See Statement of Ambassador Linnet Deily, Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative, Trade Policy Review Of The United States, Response to Issues Raised in
the Course of the Review Meeting (Jan. 16, 2004), available at http://www.usmission.ch/
press2004/0116Deily%20TPR.html [hereinafter Statement of Ambassador Deily]
(asserting that “[t]he test of time has proven that there have been no instances where a
legitimate shipment has been detained and prevented from sailing on board the vessel
upon which it was originally scheduled to depart the foreign port.”).
145
In evaluating the impact of measures like the 24-Hour Rule on developing
countries, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development concluded:
“[p]otentially, the legitimate trade of developing countries may be adversely affected,
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issues are factored in, it becomes clear that the 24-Hour Rule
has had profound effects on the trading system, and those
effects are particularly pronounced with respect to developing
countries. In implementing the 24-Hour Rule, the financial
costs have been significant for all U.S. trading partners. Even
major trading partners with sophisticated customs regimes
have seen their administrative costs increase by upwards of six
hundred million dollars.146 The expenditures are significant
enough that even exporters from rich countries are calling for
U.S. subsidies to offset the costs of implementation,147 and the
World Bank has underscored the need for importing and
exporting countries to develop a cost sharing formula optimal
for all.148
For developing countries, the implementation cost of the
24-Hour Rule is considerably higher.
Firstly, they bear
additional costs not borne by developed countries. In India, for
example, where nearly 35% of outbound trade is headed to the
United States, exporters are incurring a new cost of having to
pay local agencies to assist with document processing.149
Secondly, developing countries are starting from a lower
technological base. Most shippers and freight forwarders in
developing countries conduct a manual trade and have access
solely to telephones, typewriters and fax machines in order to
conduct their business.150 Shifting from a manual to an
automated system will require equipment, know-how, and
reliable electricity supply, to name a few things, that many
developing countries do not have.151 To be sure, in the long
term a shift to electronic transmission will undoubtedly prove
beneficial for developing countries through increases in
due to the inability of particularly small and medium size enterprises within these
countries, to effectively comply with the new requirements.” UNCTAD Report, supra
note 68, at 20.
146
For example, Japan’s administrative costs have increased by about $625
million dollars. This figure captures only the administrative costs of inputting
shipping information into the U.S. computer system (AMS). Id. at 25.
147
Global Economic Prospects, supra note 56, at 188. “The Hong Kong
Shippers Council . . . and the ASEAN Federation of Forwarders Associations [exporters
from relatively wealthy countries] have urged [the United States] to subsidize the cost
of its new requirements and U.S. importers to share . . . the burden of providing
information.” Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 184-85 (“Almost 35% of outbound trade from India is headed to the
U.S.”).
150
Id. at 185; UNCTAD Report, supra note 68, at 25.
151
Global Economic Prospects, supra note 56, at 186; UNCTAD Report, supra
note 68, at 25.
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efficiency and a decrease in costs,152 but in the short to medium
term, developing countries will have to bear the massive initial
startup costs. The risk is that developing country exporters
will find it increasingly difficult to participate competitively in
the world market.
In addition to forcing developing countries to bear
higher
economic
costs,
the
24-Hour
Rule
affects
disproportionately the type of cargo developing countries are
likely to ship. Developing countries tend to export perishable
commodities. Those goods are often harvested and prepared
for shipping at the last minute. Before the 24-Hour Rule,
documentation requirements were not an impediment to lastminute shipments as Customs would generally allow shippers
to provide preliminary data that would then be finalized up to
thirty days after the shipment had arrived in the United
States.153 This now-lost flexibility allowed shippers and freight
forwarders to adequately verify and finalize required
paperwork without delaying the shipment itself.154 But the 24Hour Rule requirement has cut the processing timeline in
developing countries to shorter and shorter lengths. Given
that processing export documents is often a time consuming
and inefficient effort in developing countries, shippers are now
requiring that shipments be processed and ready for boarding
much earlier than they used to; otherwise they risk delays and
fines.155 Ports that previously accepted cargo as few as six
hours before departure now require at least twenty-four.156 The

152

Global Economic Prospects, supra note 56, at 186.
OECD REPORT, supra note 3, at 47.
154
Id. Of course, much of this hardship could be alleviated if shippers were to
use air transportation rather than sea—presumably air transportation post-September
11 is more secure. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-616T,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY: POST-SEPTEMBER 11TH INITIATIVES AND LONG-TERM
CHALLENGES (April 1, 2003) (Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Director, Physical
Infrastructure Issues), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03616t.pdf (noting
the security loopholes in air transportation prior to September 11, 2001, and
highlighting changes after that period). But the air transportation sector is one of the
most non-liberalized in international trade. While more than 20% of African exports
enter the United States by air, the costs of air transportation in developing countries
far exceeds the same costs in the developed world. Liberalization of the air
transportation sector likely would decrease costs of transportation, which would make
developing country goods more competitive in developed country markets. Global
Economic Prospects, supra note 56, at 188.
155
Global Economic Prospects, supra note 56, at 184.
156
UNCTAD Report, supra note 68, at 23-24.
153
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economic losses for developing country exports are still being
tallied.157
The trade-distorting impact of CSI is most pronounced
with respect to developing countries. In order to remain
competitive in the current business climate, exporters in nonCSI-certified countries may be forced to ship their goods to
countries that have CSI ports for the onward voyage to the
United States.158 This will undoubtedly increase non-CSI
members’ transportation costs. Transportation costs are a
crucial determinant of a country’s ability to participate in the
global economy,159 and for developing countries even a small
increase in the price of moving goods between destinations and
across international borders serves as a formidable trade
barrier.160 Transit costs in developing country markets already
are routinely two to four times higher than in rich countries.161
Adding on the additional costs of transporting goods to CSIcertified ports for transit to the United States further increases
the price of those goods. Of even greater concern is the
possibility that, in the long run, importers and exporters may
adapt their trading patterns to avoid these additional costs by
sourcing products from countries with CSI-certified ports.
Thus, CSI violates U.S. obligations under GATT Article
I. Moreover, CSI cannot be justified under GATT Article XXI
because it lacks a development dimension. The following
section goes beyond the legal debate to explore some of the
practical reasons why CSI and future U.S. security measures
should incorporate a development dimension.

157

See UNCTAD Report, supra note 68, at 24 (noting that “[n]o clear
estimates of the overall costs of the 24-Hour Rule have, so far been published”). The
Report went on to cite an OECD study, conducted only a few months after
implementation of the Rule began, which estimated costs at $5 to $10 billion per year.
Over the long term, the OECD Report acknowledged a more realistic estimate would be
in the region of $281.7 million. Id. The OECD report did not take into account the
special circumstance of developing countries. OECD REPORT, supra note 3, at 47.
158
Global Economic Prospects, supra note 56, at 181.
159
Id.
160
Id. While the focus within the WTO (and the GATT before that) has
historically been on lowering tariffs, research has shown that for most developing
countries the costs of transporting exports to foreign markets are a much greater
hindrance to trade than are tariffs. See id. (noting that “a comparison of countries’
‘transport cost incidence’ . . . shows that for 168 out of 216 U.S. trading partners,
transport cost barriers outweigh tariff barriers”).
161
Id. at 179.
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III.

ENVISIONING A NEW POST-SEPTEMBER 11 SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE

A.

Beyond the Legal Debate: Why Future Security
Measures Should Incorporate a Development Dimension
The global war on terrorism is like watching water running
downhill. Water always goes to the place of least resistance.
—Admiral Walter F. Doran, U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander162

Globalization has created a world in which social and
economic ties are so intertwined that no country acting alone
can ensure either its own prosperity or its own security.
Particularly in the maritime transportation sector—where a
ship may be owned by a company in one country, crewed by the
nationals of a second country, and carry the cargo of a third to
a port of a fourth163—multilateral cooperation is necessary to
effectively address the threat of terrorism. But multilateralism
calls for more than cooperation amongst a group of like-minded
and similarly-situated countries.
As Mikhail Gorbachev
recently noted, “you cannot ensure your security without
Incorporating a development
ensuring global security.”164
dimension into CSI is necessary not merely because a proper
reading of the WTO Agreement would seem to call for such a
dimension, but also because failing to do so jeopardizes our own
security.
This section goes beyond the legal arguments
developed above to explore some of the practical reasons why a
development dimension in CSI, as well as in future security
measures, is crucial.
Terrorism recognizes no state boundaries. Indeed, the
new face of terrorism is one in which non-state actors play a
leading role.165 While organizations like Al-Qaeda may have
found sanctuary in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan or preSeptember 11 Pakistan, the hallmarks of these entities are
162
Press Release, The Int’l Institute for Strategic Studies, U.S. Maritime
Intelligence Sharing (Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://www.iiss.org/index.asp?pgid
=5108.
163
Global Economic Prospects, supra note 56, at 187.
164
Mikhail Gorbachev, Address at Univ. of the Pac. McGeorge Sch. of Law
(Oct. 26, 2005) [hereinafter Gorbachev Statement].
165
See, e.g., Audrey Kurth Cronin, Behind the Curve: Globalization and
International Terrorism, 27 INT’L SECURITY 30, 30 (2003) (noting that “[t]he current
wave of international terrorism, characterized by unpredictable and unprecedented
threats from nonstate actors, not only is a reaction to globalization but is facilitated by
it”).
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their ability to work across national lines and their lack of
formal ties or strict allegiance to any state. After the bombings
of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1999,
Secretary of State Madeline Albright acknowledged the rise of
this new breed of terrorism: “What is new is the emergence of
terrorist coalitions that do not answer fully to any government,
that operate across national borders and have access to
advanced technology.”166 The problem is that U.S. response to
the new terrorism has been “reactive and anachronistic.”167
Adopting measures better suited to state-centric threats, the
United States attempts to “cast twenty-first-century terrorism
into familiar strategic terms.”168
CSI and programs like it are premised on the notion
that exports from certain states pose greater security risk than
exports from others. CSI rewards participant states—mainly
developed countries—for their “foresight,”169 and Customs
focuses its resources on the presumptively more high-risk
containers
arriving
from
non-participating—mostly
developing—countries. Because the new breed of terrorists are
not themselves bounded by state lines, at least two additional
risks arise from U.S. action. One possibility is that terrorists
manage to infiltrate containers from CSI countries.
Successfully infiltrating a CSI-container virtually assures
success of the overall mission (detonating a nuclear device on
U.S. shores, for example) given the presumption that those
containers are “clean” and likely would not face further
inspection in the United States. Breaching security structures
and “hijacking” a CSI container is not a far-fetched scenario;
while CSI creates new security protocols, the system is largely
self-regulated, leading one expert to dub it a “trust but don’t
verify” program.170 There have already been a number of
166
Madeline Albright, quoted in Gideon Rose, It Could Happen Here: Facing
the New Terrorism, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (March/April 1999). The bombings killed over
200 people, most of whom were nationals of Kenya or Tanzania. See Black Americans
Among Victims of Kenya and Tanzania Bombings: National Report, JET, Aug. 24, 1999,
available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1355/is_n13_v94/ai_21052788
[hereinafter Victims of Kenya and Tanzania].
167
Cronin, supra note 165, at 30.
168
Id.
169
See CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
170
Disturbing Lack of Attention Paid to America’s Security Vulnerabilities,
Interview by Michael Moran, Executive Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, with
Stephen E. Flynn, former Coast Guard Commander (Dec. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9471 (stating that “if you rely essentially on a trust-butdon’t-verify system [where] you ask companies to be [responsible] but can’t determine if
they really are, I worry that everything we defined as low risk will be redefined as high
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security breaches. One of the most significant was Customs’
failure to inspect a number of containers that arrived in the
United States from a CSI port after those containers were
determined to be high-risk, but the host-government refused
permission to inspect them in-country.171 Moreover, employing
the most state-of-the-art inspection technology on land does not
insulate CSI countries from terrorists intersecting their
containers at sea.172 Some terrorist organizations have an
intimate knowledge of the maritime transportation industry,
not simply as interlopers but as fleet owners—Sri Lanka’s
Tamil Tigers own a substantial fleet, as does Al-Qaeda.173
Using their knowledge to access containers in transit is
particularly feasible because so-called tamper-resistant
technology—that would alert Customs to any interference with
the container in transit—is at a nascent stage of
Alternatively, containers from non-CSI
development.174
countries may become more attractive to terrorists seeking
entry into the trade supply chain. Even if CSI allows Customs
to deploy more of its resources to containers from non-CSI
countries, there are insufficient resources available to inspect
all such containers. The possibility of terrorists using such
containers to stage an attack against the United States is
certainly foreseeable. Whether in Kenya, Tanzania or Yemen,
terrorists have long exploited the more lax security systems of

risk” (alterations in original)). In 2003, pirates staged what was believed to be a
training run for a terrorist attack by boarding a container ship in the Malacca Strait
and piloting it for several hours. The pirates subsequently disappeared into the night
without stealing anything. Dillon, supra note 5. They could have easily infiltrated the
container cargo being transported.
171
See GAO REPORT, May 2005, supra note 26.
172
The Tamil Tigers, a guerilla force at war with the Sri Lankan government
since the 1980s, intercepted in-transit shipments of guns bound for the government
and converted them for their own use. OECD REPORT, supra note 3, at 14-15.
173
The Tamil Tigers are perhaps the most engaged in the shipping industry,
with a profitable fleet estimated at ten to twelve freighters. Id. at 14. The fleets are
used to generate income from legitimate shipping activities. Id. Al Qaeda’s fleet is
said to number fifteen cargo vessels. Mintz, supra note 15, at A1. Fearing Al Qaeda
would use its fleet to escape capture, the United States reportedly assembled a
coalition of ninety warships, including ships from the United Kingdom, Germany,
France, Australia, Italy, Japan and Bahrain, to patrol the waters around the Arabian
Peninsula and off the coasts of Pakistan and east Africa. Felsted & Odell, supra note
3; Mintz, supra note 15; OECD REPORT, supra note 15, at 15.
174
Container inspection technology is advancing, and it may ultimately be the
only real solution to the risks terrorists pose in this sector. The port of L.A./Long
Beach—the busiest port in the country—is moving toward 100% inspection of all cargo
in the near future. See supra note 17.
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developing countries to launch attacks against U.S. targets.175
Ignoring the central role developing countries play in the War
on Terror leaves them vulnerable to proxy attacks where they
suffer the harm but the United States is the ultimate target.176
In so doing, the United States effectively undermines its own
security.
A more reasonable approach to the new terrorism is to
assist developing countries in raising their security standards.
Ultimately, the new security protocols and advanced
technologies CSI fosters are beneficial to the trading system. If
developing countries do not begin to adopt these “best
practices,” they will be left even further behind. Recognizing
that possibility, developing countries indeed have—on their
own initiative—taken on the challenge of upgrading their
security infrastructures.177 What remains is for the United
States and other developed countries to recognize that
assisting them, rather than excluding them, is the only
practical response to the new terrorism.178 To do otherwise
would allow gaping holes in the global security infrastructure
that would only be exploited by terrorists.
Thus, CSI’s present framework of engaging first with
developed countries, and only later incorporating developing
countries into its security web, poses significant dangers to
U.S. security. By alienating developing countries, the United
States also risks undermining a multilateral trading system
that has served American interests well. The timing is
particularly inauspicious considering the trading community is
175
See Rose, supra note 166, at 131; Victims of Kenya and Tanzania, supra
note 166. Even on U.S. soil, terrorists have used such a strategy to great effect,
boarding commuter planes in states like Maine ultimately to board flights in New York
bound for Los Angeles, both major airports that have far more elaborate security
measures. See generally NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf.
176
In the U.S. embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, alone, over 200 people
were killed—most of whom were nationals. See Victims of Kenya and Tanzania, supra
note 166; see also supra note 59.
177
Jamaica, for example, adopted many of the CSI protocols well before they
were eligible to join CSI. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. Similarly, the
Agency for Air Transport Security in Africa has invested $27 million “to modernize
member states’ airport security infrastructure.” Global Economic Prospects, supra note
56, at 185.
178
Moreover, assisting developing countries makes good political sense given
the United States’ interest in engaging them in such U.S.-sponsored initiatives like
United Nations Resolution 1540, which is designed to attack the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. Resolution 1540, supra note 1, at 1-4.
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currently in the midst of a new round of trade negotiations, the
Doha Development Round,179 which is meant to “redress the
existing imbalances in multilateral trade relations.”180 In
return, developed countries are expecting developing countries
to take on even more commitments to liberalize trade and
implement WTO disciplines in areas like intellectual
property.181 But the reality for developing countries is that the
market access and other benefits they may achieve in the
round will prove meaningless if the new security architecture
excludes them from participation. In short, U.S. security
measures potentially pose the greatest non-tariff barrier to
trade for developing countries. The gains from the round will
not be enough of an offset, calling into question the (already
suspect) commitment of developed countries to redress
imbalances inherent in the current trade order. Developing
countries may ultimately conclude it is not in their interest to
take on additional commitments or, in a less overtly
confrontational response, they may adopt a “go-slow” approach
to their current and future implementation obligations.182
179
The Doha Round was launched in October 2001, only one month after the
terrible September 11 attacks. In July 2006, WTO Director General Pascal Lamy
called a halt to negotiations after delegates failed to make progress. See WORLD TRADE
ORG., REPORT OF DIRECTOR-GENERAL PASCAL LAMY, AS CHAIR OF THE TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL (July 27, 2006), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/tnc_chair_report_27july06_e.htm; see also
Madeleine Morris, What Now for Doha?, BBC NEWS, Aug. 1, 2006.
180
Pascal Lamy, Negotiations on the Doha Round Development Agenda: We
Approach the Moment of Truth, Speech to the Comm. on Int’l Trade European Parl.,
Brussels (Mar. 23, 2006), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/
sppl21_e.htm.
181
Under the WTO’s single-undertaking, all WTO members must sign on to
all WTO rules. Currently under negotiation in the Doha Round are agriculture, cotton,
non-agriculture market negotiations, services, trade facilitation, DSU, environmental,
TRIPS, and rules. World Trade Organization, Doha Work Programme, Ministerial
Declaration of 18 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/DEC (2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/final_text_e.pdf.
For
a
discussion of the single-undertaking approach, see BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 94,
at 14. For an evaluation of the Doha Round’s mandate and the possible impacts on
developing countries, see SANDRA POLASKI, WINNERS AND LOSERS: IMPACT OF THE
DOHA ROUND ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 21-56 (2006).
182
Some might argue developing countries have already adopted a “go-slow”
approach, considering that almost eleven years after the birth of the World Trade
Organization, many developing countries have failed to adequately implement their
obligations. For developing countries, the “implementation issue” is a controversial
one, with some experts maintaining it is not in the interest of some of the world’s
poorest countries to implement their WTO obligations. See, e.g., J. Michael Finger &
Phillip Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: The Development
Challenge, 23 WORLD ECON. 431, 511 (2000) (noting that “[i]mplementation will require
purchasing of equipment, training of people, establishment of systems of checks and
balances, etc. This will cost money and the amounts of money involved are
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Thus, the U.S. security framework jeopardizes relations with
developing countries, and it may call into question the new
commitments they are expected to adopt under the Doha
negotiating round. Security measures like CSI not only impede
U.S. efforts to expand the rules-based trade regime into other
sectors, but have the added effect of diluting or negating U.S.
development initiatives.
In recent years, U.S. development policy has
experienced a renaissance of sorts. In 2000, President Clinton
signed into law the African Growth and Opportunity Act
(“AGOA”), which provides duty-free and quota-free access to
exports from sub-Saharan Africa.183 AGOA was the first
significant innovation in U.S.-African trade relations in
decades. In addition, the United States has tripled its
development assistance to Africa and has embarked on
negotiations with the Southern African Customs Union, which,
if successful, would result in sub-Saharan Africa’s first free
trade area with the United States.184 Beyond the African
continent, U.S. innovations include the Millennium Challenge
Account, and a promised doubling of development assistance by
2010.185 But development assistance and market access are
insufficient inducements to counteract the competitive
advantage of countries with CSI ports. Business will not be
substantial. . . . An entire year’s development budget is at stake in many of the least
developed countries. Would such money be well spent? . . . [F]or most of the
developing and transition economies—some 100 countries—money spent to implement
the WTO rules . . . would be money unproductively invested.”).
183
19 U.S.C. § 3701 (2000). The African Growth and Opportunity Act was
signed into law in 2000 as Title 1 of the Trade and Development Act of 2000, and was
amended in 2002 by the Trade Act of 2002 (“AGOA II”). Trade Act of 2002, ch. 5, § 353,
Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (2002). In 2004, the AGOA Acceleration Act further
modified the original act (“AGOA III”). AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-274, 118 Stat. 820 (2004).
184
The Southern African Customs Union (“SACU”) came into existence in
1969; one of the oldest customs unions in the world, SACU’s members include two
regional economic powers—South Africa and Botswana. Republic of S. Africa, Dep’t of
Foreign Affairs, Southern African Customs Union (SACU): History and Present Status,
available at http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/sacu.htm. Negotiations
between the United States and SACU currently are at a deadlock. DANIELLE
LANGTON, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. RS21387, UNITED STATES-SOUTHERN AFRICAN
CUSTOMS UNION (SACU) FREE TRADE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS: BACKGROUND AND
POTENTIAL ISSUES 4 (2005).
185
The Millennium Challenge Corporation, Millennium Challenge Account,
http://www.mca.gov/about_us/overview/index.shtml; Steve Radelet & Bilal Siddiqi, Ctr.
for Global Dev., US Pledges of Aid to Africa: Let’s Do the Numbers (2005),
http://www.cgdev.org/files/2870_file_Accounting_for_Aid25.pdf (quoting President Bush
as saying, “[T]he United States has tripled overseas development aid to Africa during
my presidency and we’re making a strong commitment for the future: between 2004
and 2010, I propose to double aid to Africa once again.”).
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lured to Africa or other locations in the developing world as
long as U.S. security measures continue to pose an expensive
Without
and unpredictable non-tariff barrier to trade.186
addressing that barrier, U.S. development initiatives are
destined to fail—wasting both economic and political resources.
Five years after the tragedy of September 11, the
unilateralism that characterized U.S. action in the immediate
aftermath appears to be abating.187 More developing countries
are being added to the CSI program, and Customs has worked
within the International Maritime Organization to
internationalize the security protocols developed under CSI.188
The United States has also played a significant role in security
measures like the Proliferation Security Initiative and
Resolution 1540—two significant multilateral efforts to address
terrorism.189 While not too late, U.S. action is too little in scope,
relegating multilateralism and the interests of developing
countries to a mere afterthought. The next section explores
possible approaches to terrorism that balance security needs
with development objectives.
B.

Crafting a Response to Terrorism that Balances Security
with Development
A world where some live in comfort and plenty, while half of the
human race lives on less than $2 a day is neither just nor stable.
Including all of the world’s poor in an expanding circle of
development—and opportunity—is a moral imperative and one of
the top priorities of U.S. international policy.
—President George W. Bush190

186

For the economic impact of CSI, see discussion supra section II.B.2.
U.S. foreign policy in general appears to have taken an about face from the
go-it-alone strategy prevalent in the immediate aftermath of September 11. See, e.g.,
Sanger, supra note 41 (noting that in a recent State of the Union address, President
Bush, who once viewed globalization as “mushy Clintonianism,” cautioned that “the
road of isolationism and protectionism may seem broad and inviting—yet it ends in
danger and decline”).
188
Recent developing countries admitted to CSI include Jamaica and The
Bahamas. See Ports in CSI, supra note 31. In July 2004, the IMO’s International Ship
and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code)—a comprehensive set of measures to
enhance the security of ships and port facilities—entered into force. The mandatory
security measures are included as amendments to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea
Convention. See International Maritime Organization, http://www.imo.org (last visited
Jan. 6, 2007).
189
Valencia, supra note 1; Resolution 1540, supra note 1.
190
REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 21 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/
nss.html [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY].
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Poverty and the maldistribution of wealth among
nations create instability.191 Globalization has only exacerbated
the divide between the wealthy and the poor; it also enables
those who adopt violence against civilians as a tool for social
change to export their discontent around the world. Thomas
Barnett, author of The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in
the Twenty-First Century, posits that modern instabilities in
the world order stem almost exclusively from those countries
left out of the “functioning core” of globalization.192 The U.S.
embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 reinforce
the lesson: countries relegated to globalization’s periphery
merely serve as a fertile hunting ground for terrorists.193
Logically then, integrating those countries left behind is not
just a moral imperative but is the last best hope for ensuring
U.S. and global security.194 The proposals that follow are thus
broader than CSI or any single security measure; rather, they
seek to inform the underlying basis from which the United
States implements future antiterrorism initiatives.195
191

The point is made most clear when one examines countries where wealth is
stagnated in the hands of a tiny minority. Amy Chua’s World on Fire highlights the
dangers of technical assistance projects that export U.S.-style free markets and
democracy to developing countries without the legal and regulatory mechanism to
protect against a “market-dominant minority” hijacking the bulk of economic activity.
See generally AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY
BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003).
192
“America can only increase its security when it extends connectivity or
expands globalization’s reach, and by doing so, progressively reduces those trouble
spots or off-grid locations where security problems and instability tend to concentrate.”
THOMAS P.M. BARNETT, THE PENTAGON’S NEW MAP: WAR AND PEACE IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 56 (2004).
193
See Victims of Kenya and Tanzania, supra note 166.
194
President Bush’s statement in the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy,
thus somewhat misses the point. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 190.
While helping the poor has been a moral imperative at least since the biblical period, in
a post-September 11 security environment “doing good” is inevitably linked to peace
and security.
195
Any prescriptions raised by those outside the government’s national
security agencies risk being labeled “facile.” The fears and uncertainties engendered
by terrorist threats inevitably raise strong feelings of faith in government—citizens
often believe, indeed need to believe, that government officials will do what is best to
protect the nation’s security. What we are quickly learning—and perhaps history has
already shown—is that even in the face of terrorism our national response runs the
risk of being captured by special interests and pork barrel politics.
A disturbing report on U.S. spending on port defense has found that
funding that should be utilized to shore up the nation’s most vulnerable ports—its
frontline in the War on Terror—instead has become a casualty of pork barrel politics.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REVIEW OF PORT
SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM (Jan. 2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/
mgmtrpts/OIG_05-10_Jan05.pdf. The study found that Wyoming has received four
times as much antiterrorism money per capita as New York. Grants were also given
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Some argue that national security considerations trump
all others, including civil liberties and certainly international
obligations.196 Particularly where commercial interests are
concerned, the average citizen likely would rather see the
government err on the side of caution, even if the measures
taken unduly impact commerce or development.197 But the U.S.
government—and more specifically, Customs—does not
subscribe to that view. CSI aims to balance security interests
with trade and development considerations198—one objective of
the program is “enhancing homeland and border security while
facilitating growth and economic development within the
international trade community.”199 Thus, the “closed borders”
approach to terrorism some would advocate simply is not an
option. It remains an open question, however, as to how to
strike the proper balance between security, commerce and
economic development in a principled way. Customs adopted
CSI’s staged-implementation approach, relegating admission of
most developing countries to some distant time in the future,
based on its assessment that “efforts had to begin somewhere,
and it just made sense to start with the largest volume

for purposes “other than security against an act of terrorism.” Id. at 35. For example,
one small and remote facility that received less than twenty ships per year was
awarded $180,000 to install security lights; at another port, which stood next to a
luxury entertainment pavilion, a $25,000 grant was awarded to install video
surveillance equipment and alarms, a project Department of Homeland Security staff
concluded “appear[ed] to support a normal course of business.” Id. at 27, 35-36
(referenced by Eric Lipton, Audit Faults U.S. for its Spending on Port Defense, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2005, § 1, at 1). See also Eric Lipton, In Kentucky Hills, Bonanza, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 2006, § 1, at 1 (noting that Kentucky Representative Harold Rogers,
chairman of the House subcommittee that controls the Homeland Security budget, has
apparently used his position to benefit his hometown of Corbin, a small, poor, rural
community in southeastern Kentucky.
Rogers mandated that tamper-resistant
identification cards that are to be issued to maritime workers be produced in Corbin
using old technology (used in Corbin), rather than “smart-cards,” which are
demonstrably superior.).
196
See, e.g., Cole, supra note 39, at 22; see also Statement of U.S. Delegate
Before the GATT Council, supra note 131 (“there is no distinction between developed
and developing countries in matters of security”).
197
Fear—even irrational fear—plays a significant role in public perception of
the risks of terrorism. For a discussion of the role of public perception in guiding
government action in the face of fear and uncertainty, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF
FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 83, 96-97 (2005).
198
See, e.g., Statement of Ambassador Deily, supra note 144. (“It is fully
recognized that the U.S. economy, as well as the global economy, cannot thrive without
the expeditious movement of international trade. These initiatives have been designed
to identify and carefully screen high-risk cargo shipments while facilitating the
expeditious movement of legitimate trade.”).
199
GAO REPORT, May 2005, supra note 26, at 8.
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ports.”200 Remembering that CSI was adopted just four months
after the September 11 attacks,201 Customs’ desire to “do
something” in the face of such a calamity is perhaps
understandable.
While such an approach may be
administratively convenient, and it may have given Americans
some comfort at a time when fear and the perception of risk
from terrorist attack was at an unprecedented high, it is far
from principled. Thus, in addition to its legal deficiency, CSI
fails to advance Customs’ own objective of ensuring security
while “facilitating growth and economic development.”202
Balancing new security priorities with economic and
trade objectives is a complicated task given the potential risks
to human life should the United States underprotect its
borders.
But in assessing the real risk from maritime
terrorism, threat assessment cannot be confused with
vulnerability assessment. Threat assessment determines the
probability of a terrorist attack while vulnerability assessment
evaluates the damage likely to ensue from an attack.203
Confusing the two could result in a remote possibility being
deemed an imminent threat.204 In 2000, the Interagency
Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports concluded
that the threat of terrorism to U.S. seaports was low, although
vulnerability to terrorist attack was rated high.205 More
recently, the GAO explored the impetus behind CSI—the fear
that terrorists may appropriate containers to transport
weapons of mass destruction or a nuclear device to the United
States—and concluded it was not an imminent threat. While
acknowleging that containerized cargo is vulnerable to some
form of terrorist action, the GAO report determined: “[A]n
extensive body of work . . . by the [FBI] and academic, think
tank, and business organizations concluded that . . . the
likelihood of . . . containers [being used to move WMDs to the
United States] is considered low.”206 The GAO’s finding is no
200

Customs and Border Protection, CSI Fact Sheet (Mar. 8, 2004), at 3,
available at http://r0.unctad.org/ttl/docs-unctadxi/csi_5ffactsheet052404.pdf.
201
Slide Presentation, supra note 23.
202
GAO REPORT, May 2005, supra note 26, at 8.
203
Nancy A. Renfroe & Joseph L. Smith, Threat/Vulnerability Assessments
and Risk Analysis, WHOLE BUILDING DESIGN GUIDE, available at http://www.wbdg.org/
design/riskanalysis.php.
204
Id.; see also Statement Issued by the International Code Council (“ICC”),
Maritime Security: Separating Fact from Hype (June 30, 2004), available at
http://www.cargosecurityinternational.com/print.asp?id=2947.
205
Port and Maritime Security Act, supra note 13, at 6.
206
GAO REPORT, May 2005, supra note 26, at 5.
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reason for inaction, but it does suggest there is time to
construct measures to protect containers and the supply chain
that make sense—in other words, measures that adopt a
principled approach to balancing security, commerce and
development considerations.
Redressing CSI’s imbalance and increasing U.S.
security requires a manifold approach. The realization that
much of global insecurity will stem from those countries not
integrated into globalizations “functioning core,”207 coupled with
the arrival of a “new terrorism” without borders, points to the
central role developing countries must play in the fight against
terror.
Future security measures must consciously and
explicitly solicit their participation because the United States
cannot ensure its security without their active engagement.208
In short, the very status of developing countries as marginal
participants in the globalization revolution should make them
“of strategic and political significance” to the United States.209
What would a more balanced CSI that incorporated a
development dimension and was designed to address the new
terrorism look like?
First, CSI would include technical assistance-capacity
building as well as development assistance as part of its core
structure.
Without such assistance, developing countries
cannot effectively be brought into the security fold.
Membership in CSI is not without significant financial costs.
At a minimum, CSI members must invest in state-of-the-art
equipment and increased training for personnel all along the
supply chain from customs officials to shippers to
manufacturers and exporters.210 The costs of required scanning
equipment range from one to five million dollars, while total
security-related implementation costs are estimated at 1-3% of
the value of traded goods.211 Many developing countries would
not be able to absorb those costs alone; indeed even developed

207

BARNETT, supra note 192.
Mikhail Gorbachev’s prophetic statement that we cannot ensure our
security without ensuring global security highlights the massive shift in the global
security environment since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Gorbachev Statement, supra
note 164.
209
See CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 9 (language used in Phase II of CSI
implementation).
210
Id. Of course some countries will already have had the equipment in use.
211
Global Economic Prospects, supra note 56, at 186. Note that the OECD
suggests a more modest impact. See OECD REPORT, supra note 3, at 50.
208
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countries like Greece apparently find CSI implementation
challenging.212
Admittedly, the idea that a country like the United
States may have to pay others to ensure its national security
may be unpalatable to some, but it is surely money well spent.
Without question, helping ensure the security of developing
countries’ exports also ensures U.S. security and the security of
the supply chain.
As one of the biggest providers of
development and technical assistance aid in the world,213 the
United States recognizes funding must often be provided to less
wealthy countries in order to protect and advance U.S.
interests.214 Moreover, adopting a multilateral approach to
fighting terrorism would enable the United States to share the
costs of assisting developing countries with wealthy allies and
international lending institutions like the International
Monetary Fund or the World Bank. In any case, providing
technical assistance is specifically contemplated in the current
CSI. But by the time such assistance is provided in Phase III
of CSI implementation, it may well be too little too late.
In addition to funding, many developing countries would
need a transfer of technology and know-how to effectively
implement CSI.
Currently, CSI requires participating
countries to establish and automate certain risk management
systems to identify potentially high-risk containers, and they
must also conduct port assessments to identify and resolve
vulnerable links in a port’s infrastructure.215 Moreover, all CSI
participants must own non-intrusive inspectional equipment
(“NII”), which is equipment with gamma or X-ray imaging
capabilities.216 NII equipment allows officials to inspect a
container without having to open it, making inspections more
efficient and less disruptive to the flow of legitimate trade.217
The United States should grant such equipment to developing
countries that do not have it, and of course provide the experts
212

Greece Signs Agreement, supra note 35.
See U.S. Agency for Int’l Development, Millennium Challenge Account
Update: Fact Sheet (June 3, 2002), available at http://www.usaid.gov/press/
releases/2002/fs_mca.html (“The United States is the world’s largest bilateral donor to
the developing world. While many donors provide economic assistance, the United
States provides resources both to strengthen security and foster economic growth.”).
214
Indeed, the United States has already provided such assistance with
respect to Greece. See Greece Signs Agreement, supra note 35.
215
See supra note 32.
216
Id.
217
Id.
213
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who can help train local personnel to use them. There is some
precedent for such action. When it sought to protect turtles
from the nets of shrimp farmers, the United States gave
Caribbean fishers “turtle exclusion devices” that enabled
farmers to harvest their product for export while protecting the
turtles.218 More recently, Customs provided NII equipment to
Greece in order to bring that country online in time to host the
2004 Olympics.219 That level of innovative thinking should be
used immediately on a larger scale to assist developing
countries in meeting CSI’s security protocols.
Perhaps the most difficult challenge in constructing a
more principled approach to CSI implementation is in
addressing the question of which developing countries should
be permitted head-of-the-line privileges to join CSI.
By
relegating admission of developing countries to some time in
the future—and slowly allowing in some of the more advanced
and politically powerful developing countries220—Customs has
not yet had to fully deal with that thorny issue. It is
admittedly a difficult one because certain resource constraints
must be taken into consideration. CSI implementation is costly
even for the United States, both in monetary and human
resource terms. For each CSI port, Customs must deploy four
to five officers, computers and related paraphernalia to the
foreign port.221 Starting with a budget of only $4.3 million in
2002, CSI has expanded to $126 million in 2005 and about
$139 million was requested in fiscal year 2006.222 In addition to
the economic costs, CSI implementation presents formidable
logistical challenges. As the number of CSI ports increases,
Customs is finding it more difficult to attract qualified
personnel to staff overseas posts.223 Currently, thirty CSI ports
are fully operational with Customs staff in place, but as the
program expands out to “hardship” posts like Brazil and
Greece, the expectation is that staffing will become a more
218
Report of the Panel, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, at 1, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998); unfortunately, U.S. generosity
was not rewarded in the WTO. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 124, ¶¶ 187-88 (Appellate
Body Report).
219
Greece Signs Agreement, supra note 35.
220
Business Report, supra note 48 (noting that this came after a South
African official’s comment that CSI could pose challenge to WTO rules).
221
GAO REPORT 2003, supra note 27, at 12-13.
222
See GAO REPORT, May 2005, supra note 26, at 9; GAO REPORT 2003, supra
note 27, at 13.
223
See GAO REPORT 2003, supra note 27, at 28.
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difficult issue.224 These costs limit how quickly CSI can expand
and—potentially—which countries can be included. But these
resources constraints must be handled in a way that does not
undermine security or penalize developing countries
themselves.
It is of course impossible to construct a list of developing
countries that under all circumstances should be incorporated
in CSI and future security measures. But it is possible to
develop a set of parameters for admission that do not rely
exclusively on a country’s economic status. In the first
instance, those countries that have the requisite equipment in
place should not be denied admission. Thus, developing
countries like Jamaica, Malaysia and South Africa, now part of
CSI, would have been granted admission much earlier.225
Another concern with CSI’s current implementation
strategy is that on certain continents, a single country is
privileged. In Africa, for example, South Africa is the only
country with a CSI port, and until recently, South America had
no ports at all.226 One response is to ensure that on every
continent at least five to ten developing countries be
incorporated in CSI. The criterion for admission cannot be
based principally on whether a country has “substantial” trade
with the United States,227 or at least the term must be loosely
defined. What might be considered de minimis trade by U.S.
standards could well be the economic life-blood of a developing
country.
Finally, the question arises whether certain conditions
should be imposed on developing countries in return for
admission to CSI. “Conditionalities” are often imposed in
World Bank or IMF lending, as well as in preference programs
developed by wealthy nations to benefit developing countries.228

224

Id.
Jamaica became a CSI member in 2006—years after CSI had been
established. Malaysia joined in March 2004, and South Africa in February 2003. See
Ports in CSI, supra note 31.
226
CSI Fact Sheet supra note 9, at 1.
227
One of CSI’s admission criteria is that a country have “regular, direct and
substantial” container trade with the United States. Id. at 3.
228
AGOA, for example, sets certain conditions for membership, adding only
those countries that:
225

have established, or are making continual progress toward establishing the
following: market-based economies; the rule of law and political pluralism;
elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and investment; protection of intellectual
property; efforts to combat corruption; policies to reduce poverty, increasing
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It is a popular way for those providing the funding to ensure
their resources are being properly utilized. Much of the
rationale
behind
conditionalities—protecting
against
corruption and waste—would presumably (and hopefully) not
be at issue here given that improper implementation of CSI
would expose developing countries themselves to terrorist
attack.
CSI itself imposes certain conditions—such as having
the requisite equipment and risk assessment capabilities229—
that would be non-controversial if applied to all members. But
one could imagine other conditions that would elicit
controversy; for example, what if the United States were to
require as a condition for admission that a developing country
agree to launch trade facilitation negotiations within the WTO?
Conditions that go to the heart of the proper implementation of
CSI, including possible audits to ensure that monies are being
well-spent, make some sense and could be developed in a way
that does not unduly trample on the sovereignty rights of
developing countries. Conditions that are only tangentially
related to CSI implementation, however, would likely force
developing countries to rebel. To the extent possible, CSI
admission should not be used as a tool to advance other
interests. U.S. security interests—as well as the interests of
the supply chain—are too important to be exposed to
traditional “pork-barrel” politics.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Terrorism was not invented on September 11, 2001.
But when the Towers came tumbling down, it signaled the
arrival of a new form of terrorism and a shift in globalization.230
The “new terrorism” is one that is highly mobile,
technologically advanced, unfettered by state control, and
profoundly lethal. In turn, the new terrorism revealed a need
to re-conceptualize the link between globalization and security.
Before September 11, discussions of that link tended to focus
on the breakdown of domestic control that occurred when
availability of health care and educational opportunities; protection of human
rights and worker rights; and elimination of certain child labor practices.
H.R. 434, 106th Cong. (2000).
229
CSI Fact Sheet, supra note 9, at 3.
230
For a provocative discussion of the nexus between globalization and
terrorism, see BARNETT, supra note 192.
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protestors took to the streets during international meetings to
demonstrate
against
the
ever-encroaching
tide
of
231
But September 11 demonstrated that security
globalization.
and globalization are interrelated.232 Terrorists fly a plane into
the World Trade Center, and along with the damage to lives
and property come border closings, which threaten whole
industries because in a just-in-time world, American
enterprises cannot prosper without inputs from businesses
around the world. This interrelationship of security, commerce
and globalization has moved the lowly shipping container to
the frontline in the War on Terror.
In an effort to protect the advances made possible by
globalization, shipping containers—which facilitate the
interconnection of countries—must be protected. Given the
challenges terrorism poses to the system, U.S. action is not
surprising; indeed, action is necessary. The WTO Agreement is
not an impediment to taking such action, but it does impose
certain obligations. One of those obligations is the need to
balance security considerations with development objectives.
The United States cannot ensure its security at the expense of
further impoverishing economically vulnerable countries. Such
a course of action, in the end, would only make the terrorists’
objectives that much easier to attain.
Before September 11, the debate in trade and
development circles centered on proponents of “free trade”
versus those who advocated “fair trade.” But in the current
security environment, secure trade adds another dimension to
the debate. A stable and prosperous trading system will only
be achieved when all three elements—free, fair and secure—
are incorporated within an expanded trade regime.

231
See, e.g., Paul Reynolds, Eyewitness: The Battle of Seattle, BBC NEWS, Dec.
2, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/547581.stm. The high-watermark for the
anti-globalization protestors was, of course, the WTO Seattle Ministerial Conference in
1999. When the conference ended, without the long-awaited launching of a new round
of negotiations, the antiglobalists claimed victory.
232
Ironically, while the terrorists were in part protesting a globalization
phenomenon that leaves much of the Middle East behind, their mission could not have
succeeded without the advances in telecommunications and other technologies that
globalization made possible. See, e.g., Kurt M. Campbell, Globalization’s First War,
WASH. QUARTERLY, Winter 2002, at 10-11.

